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INTRODUCTION
While many lawyers remember only fragments of the collateral
bar rule from first-year civil procedure class, those whom the rule
most regularly affects-counsel for labor leaders, demonstration or-
ganizers, and newspaper publishers-understand the awesome power
that this rule gives to a court order.' Collateral bar allowed, for exam-
t B.S., Cornell University, 1997; candidate forJ.D., Cornell Law School, 2003. The
author thanks Professor Kevin M. Clermont for his invaluable comments and suggestions.
I For the purposes of this Note, "court order" refers to any equitable remedy by
which a court commands a person to act or refrain from acting in a particular way, the
disobedience of which is punishable by criminal contempt. The term thus encompasses,
among other things, preliminary and permanent injunctions, temporary restraining or-
ders, subpoenas, and decrees. For a discussion of these types of remedies, see generally 1
DAN B. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES § 2 (2d ed. 1993).
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pie, a federal district court to fine the United Mine Workers for dis-
obeying an anti-strike injunction without regard to whether Congress
had specifically deprived the court ofjurisdiction to issue such injunc-
tions.2 It allowed a Birmingham court to fine and imprison Martin
Luther King, Jr. for disobeying an anti-demonstration injunction with-
out regard to whether the injunction violated King's First Amendment
rights. 3 Very likely, collateral bar influenced the New York Times to
refrain from publishing the famous Pentagon Papers in the face of a
federal district court's unconstitutional gag order.4
The collateral bar rule limits the grounds on which a person who
has disobeyed a court order can challenge that order to avoid being
punished for criminal contempt. At its core, the rule generally pre-
vents such a person from challenging the merits of the order, even if
the order infringed on constitutional rights.5 In addition, the rule
generally prevents such a person from challenging the court's jurisdic-
tion to have issued the order. 6 The rule thus forces people to obey
erroneous and invalid court orders and to challenge them directly (if
at all), unless they are willing to incur the cost of punishment.
In spite of these significant consequences, collateral bar remains
an obscure and often misunderstood rule. It receives scant treatment
in law school texts, seeming to exist on the periphery of both civil
procedure and constitutional law, but not entirely within either sub-
ject. There has been some valuable commentary on the rule, but the
commentary has focused specifically on the rule's application in the
First Amendment context and on the extent to which the rule is justi-
fied. 7 When the courts discuss collateral bar, they often use formulaic
2 See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293-95 (1947); infra Part
I.B.2.
3 See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315-21 (1967); infra Part I.A.
4 See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding the order
unconstitutional); Ariel L. Bendor, Prior Restraint, Incommensurability, and the Constitutional-
ism of Means, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 289, 309-10 (1999) (discussing possible reasons for the
New York Times's obedience); infra note 14. Admittedly, the reasons for the New York
Times's decision to obey are not entirely clear, and factors other than collateral bar proba-
bly contributed. See OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 71 (1978); Christina E.
Wells, Bringing Structure to the Law of Injunctions Against Expression, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1,
62 n.305 (2000).
5 See Walker, 388 U.S. at 315-21; Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922); infra
Part I.A.
6 See United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 293-94 (1947); United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S.
563, 573 (1906); infra Part I.B.
7 See, e.g., Richard E. Labunski, The "Collateral Bar" Rule and the First Amendment: The
Constitutionality of Enforcing Unconstitutional Orders, 37 Am. U. L. REV. 323 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Labunski, Collateral Bar Rule] (surveying federal and state case law and advocating ex-
ceptions to the collateral bar rule in the First Amendment context); Richard Labunski, A
First Amendment Exception to the "Collateral Bar" Rule: Protecting Freedom of Expression and the
Legitimacy of Courts, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 405 (1995) [hereinafter Labunski, First Amendment
Exception] (same); Hal Scott Shapiro, The Collateral Bar Rule-Transparently Invalid: A Theo-
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(and inaccurate) language,8 and they rarely look closely at the rule's
precise scope or its underlying justification. 9
More importantly, although the Supreme Court has recognized
the need to temper the collateral bar rule with some exceptions, it has
not clearly explained the exact scope of these exceptions.' 0 The lower
federal courts have responded by interpreting the Supreme Court's
exceptions as narrowly as possible, and by generally applying the col-
lateral bar rule in a harsh and mechanical fashion." As a result, col-
lateral bar ends up placing undue burdens on people confronted with
court orders. 12 Those who disobey, thinking they can rely on excep-
tions to the rule, are often in for a nasty shock.13 Those who know
retical and Historical Perspective, 24 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 561 (1991) (reviewing cases
from the First Amendment context in arguing that the rule should be abrogated). One
exception is Professor Zechariah Chafee,Jr.'s 1950 discussion of collateral bar. ZECHARIAH
CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQuiTy 296-380 (1950). Chafee placed the rule in the
broader context of collateral attack in general by stressing the fundamental distinction
between the merits of a court order and the court's authority to issue the order. See id. At
that time, however, Chafee refused to recognize significant developments in the rules sur-
rounding collateral attack, see id. at 319 n.42, and his approach deserves to be revisited and
updated now that these developments have become permanent fixtures.
8 See United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1995) (inaccurately stating,
without qualification, that collateral bar does not apply to an order that exceeds a court's
jurisdiction); United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d
1080, 1098 (Ist Cir. 1992) (inaccurately citing, among other cases, United Mine Workers to
support the proposition that "[i]t is established beyond peradventure that a party may
bring an appeal to challenge a contempt order, notwithstanding the failure to obtain a stay
or comply with the order's terms, if the order was entered by a court lacking jurisdiction
over ... the subject matter"); In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1401 (11th Cir. 1991) (inaccu-
rately stating that "if the issuing court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying
controversy... its order may be violated with impunity"); Dep't of Labor OSHA v. Hern
Iron Works, Inc. (In re Establishment Inspection of Hern Iron Works, Inc.), 881 F.2d 722,
726 & n.12, 727 (9th Cir. 1989) (observing the lack ofjudicial certainty as to the exceptions
to the collateral bar rule and inaccurately stating that collateral bar does not apply if the
court issuing the order lacked subject-matter jurisdiction); FTC v. Verity Int'l, Ltd., 140 F.
Supp. 2d 313, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (inaccurately stating that the only exceptions to collat-
eral bar are where the order exceeds the court's jurisdiction or is transparently invalid); In
re Criminal Contempt Proceedings Against Crawford, 133 F. Supp. 2d 249, 260 (W.D.N.Y.
2001) (same); United States v. Walker, No. 94-CR-32S, 1994 WL 759866, at *3 (W.D.N.Y.
Dec. 21, 1994) (inaccurately stating that "if the issuing court lacks subject-matter jurisdic-
tion over the underlying controversy... its order may be violated and no contempt sanc-
tion may be imposed").
9 To the extent that courts do seek to explain the rule's justification, it is often with
more rhetorical flourish than substance. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
10 See infra Part I1.B.
11 See infra Part II.B.
12 See infta Part II.A-B.
13 For instance, litigants in the First, Second and Ninth Circuits, and in the District of
New Mexico, have all faced courts intent on applying the Supreme Court's exceptions
narrowly. See infra notes 171-72, 206-09 and accompanying text. Another litigant, CNN,
probably would have found the Eleventh Circuit equally intent on narrowly applying the
Supreme Court's exceptions after it confidently disobeyed a 1990 gag order; in that case,
however, the case's procedural posture combined with the court's anger over CNN's bra-
zen disobedience led the court to actually uphold the order itself. See United States v.
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better tend to go out of their way to comply, even if the orders tram-
ple their rights.14
Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1990). The case arose when a federal district court
ordered CNN not to broadcast tapes of former Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega speak-
ing with his legal defense team while in U.S. custody. See Amy Singer, How Prior Restraint
Came to America, AM. Lnw., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 88. CNN's lawyers apparently were so confi-
dent that the order fell within one of the Supreme Court's ambiguous exceptions that they
did not raise a single concern about the repercussions of broadcasting the tapes. In addi-
tion, they refused to permit the judge to listen to the tapes for the purpose of evaluating
the harm their broadcast might cause to Noriega's rights, and even let CNN's president
announce to the press that CNN was disobeying the order. See id. at 91-92. In fact, far
from allowing CNN's defense, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the restraining order (which
CNN was still trying to quash after the fact). See Noriega, 917 F.2d at 1552. Although this
mooted the question of whether the collateral bar rule would apply at the contempt pro-
ceeding, it appears that this decision-the first federal appellate decision in over twenty-
five years upholding a prior restraint-was largely influenced by CNN's disobedience. See
Singer, supra, at 90, 92-93. The court stressed that "[w]hile appealing to our nation's
judicial system for relief, CNN is at the same time defiant of that system's reasonable direc-
tions." Noriega, 917 F.2d at 1551. This turn of events made the press statement by CNN's
president especially embarrassing at the subsequent contempt proceeding, as the state-
ment obviously undercut CNN's defense that it had not willfully violated the order. See
United States v. CNN, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1549, 1561-63 (S.D. Fla. 1994); CNN Asks Judge to
Ignore Its 1990 Report on Use of Noriega Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1994, at A9. For more on
CNN's Noriega fiasco, see CNN Found in Contempt for Use of Noriega Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
2, 1994, at A14 (explaining the judge's rationale for holding CNN in contempt); David
Lyons, CNNArgues Its Side on NoriegaJail Tapes, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 26, 1994, at A12 (explain-
ing CNN's failed argument that Noriega's counsel had waived confidentiality); Ruth Mar-
cus, Rights of Press and Defendants Collide in Noriega Tapes Case, WASH. PosT, Nov. 12, 1990, at
Al (summarizing the conflict between freedom of the press and the attorney-client
relationship).
14 In the Pentagon Papers case, a federal judge had ordered the New York Times to
temporarily refrain from publishing a set of internal defense department documents on
U.S. decision making in Vietnam. See United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp 324
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (granting a temporary restraining order, but not a preliminary injunc-
tion), remanded by 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971) (instructing the District Court to reconsider
granting the preliminary injunction). Although the Times had been willing to violate a
federal statute to publish the documents, see Bendor, supra note 4, at 309, and although the
order appeared to be an unconstitutional prior restraint, the paper nonetheless obeyed
the order during the fifteen days it took to convince the Supreme Court to overturn it. See
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714-15 (1971).
Similarly, in September 1995, a federal judge ordered Business Week magazine not to
publish an article that relied on documents under court seal in a pending case, and also
ordered one of the magazine's editors to testify about the confidential source from whom
she had obtained the documents. Although Business Week's counsel was convinced that the
first order was an unconstitutional prior restraint, and although the second order clearly
trod in the sensitive area ofjournalistic privilege, that magazine was nonetheless prepared
to obey both. See Deirdre Carmody, A Close Call for Business Week Shows the Weakness in
Journalists' Protective Armor, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 16, 1995, at D7; Deirdre Carmody, Magazine
Pulls Article Under Order, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1995, at A16.
These cases represent just a handful of the frequent situations in which parties obey
court orders that they believe trample on their rights. The frequency of these situations is
only likely to increase in the near future, given the secrecy surrounding terrorism investiga-
tions and the Bush administration's frequent clashes with the press. On the former, see,
for example, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Reporter Held in Contempt for
Refusing to Name Source (July 26, 2002) (discussing a case in which a federal judge ordered a
Virginia reporter to disclose who showed him the sealed arrest warrant of a material wit-
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This Note seeks both to illuminate the contours of the federal
collateral bar rule and to define the precise way in which courts
should temper it as a matter of constitutional law. 15 Part I suggests
that the rule is best understood within the conceptual framework of
collateral attack on prior judgments in general. Using this framework
as a guide, it becomes clear that collateral bar limits attacks on court
orders much in the same way that res judicata limits attacks on final
judgments in general. Part II examines the Supreme Court's ambigu-
ous pronouncements on the exceptions to collateral bar, and com-
pares these exceptions to the rule's underlying justification. The most
important yet least understood exception focuses on the disobedient
party's opportunity to appeal the order. Specifically, courts should
allow a party to challenge the merits of an order as a defense to crimi-
nal contempt when that party was unable to obtain full appellate re-
view of the order without permanently sacrificing a significant right.
This Note concludes that the Supreme Court should clarify the scope
of collateral bar and its exceptions if an appropriate case reaches the
Court. In the meantime, however, the lower courts should interpret
the Supreme Court's existing precedent in the manner suggested,
particularly with regard to collateral bar's key exception.
I
UNDERSTANDING COLLATERAL BAR: SCOPE OF THE RULE
The best way to understand the collateral bar rule is to think of it
in the context of collateral attack on judgments in general. A court
order is a type of judgment,' 6 and when a party challenges a court
order as a defense to criminal contempt charges, this is a collateral
attack. 17 In this context, there is a fundamental distinction between
ness in a terrorism investigation), at http://www.rcfp.org/news/2002/0726united.html
(last visited Sept. 7, 2002). On the latter, see, for example, Russ Baker, What Are They
Hiding, THE NATION, Feb. 25, 2002, at 11; Magazine Protests Writer's Treatment by State Depart-
ment, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2002, at 16; David Stout, Pentagon Pursues Leak of Anti-Iraq Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2001, at A3.
15 Collateral bar is a common-law rule, and its scope varies from jurisdiction to juris-
diction. See Labunski, Collateral Bar Rule, supra note 7, at 348-64. This Note looks specifi-
cally at the scope of the rule as it exists in the federal common law. In addition, this Note
looks at the limits that the federal Constitution places on the rule's application in all U.S.
jurisdictions.
16 Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limit the types of court orders that
fall within the definition of 'judgment" to those that are appealable, see FED. R. Civ. P.
54(a), this Note refers to "judgments" in a broader sense to include also non-appealable
orders, such as subpoenas duces tecum.
17 The concept of a collateral attack, as distinguished from a direct attack, hinges on
the purpose and nature of the proceeding in which the attack occurs. A collateral attack is
one that is advanced to avoid the effects of ajudgment in a particular proceeding. A direct
attack is generally one that is advanced to overturn the judgment itself. A collateral attack
is made defensively and in a separate proceeding from the one in which the judgment was
rendered. A direct attack is generally made offensively and either in the same proceeding
2002]
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the merits-correctness-of the court's judgment and the court's au-
thority to render the judgment at all. 18 The latter issue turns on
whether the court had subject-matter and territorial jurisdiction, and
whether the parties received adequate notice, including an opportu-
nity to be heard. 19
When it comes to final judgments, the basic rules of res judicata
limit the grounds on which parties can advance collateral attacks. Res
judicata lays down the fundamental principle that one cannot collater-
ally attack flaws in a judgment's merits, whereas one can sometimes
collaterally attack flaws in the court's authority to have rendered the
judgment.20 If one is successful in the latter attack, then the judg-
ment is said to be invalid, and it has no resjudicata effect in the collat-
eral proceeding, regardless of its merits. 21
Whereas the normal rules of res judicata deal with all types of
finaljudgments, collateral bar deals with specific types of judgments-
court orders-regardless of their finality. 22 If the court order is a final
judgment, then the normal rules of res judicata will treat it in the
in which the judgment was rendered (via a motion for relief) or in an independent pro-
ceeding brought specifically to obtain relief from the judgment. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OFJUDGMENTS introductory note to ch. 5 at 140-43 (1982); ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN
M. CLERMONT, RESJUDICATA 248-49 (2001). Although the distinction between collateral
and direct attacks is not always clear or useful, see CASAD & CLERMONT, supra, at 256-57, a
challenge to a court order made as a defense in a criminal contempt proceeding clearly
functions as a collateral attack.
18 See CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 296-301.
19 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 1-12 (1982); CASAD & CLERMONT,
supra note 17, at 49-50.
20 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS §§ 12, 17, 65 (1982); CASAD & CLERMONT,
supra note 17, at 249-61.
21 See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 17, at 259-61.
22 One might view collateral bar as a special area of resjudicata. Under this view, it is
resjudicata itself that limits collateral attacks on court orders, and the term "collateral bar"
simply connotes the special situations in which resjudicata does so in the context of crimi-
nal contempt, and without regard to its normal rules about finality. See E-mail from Kevin
M. Clermont, Flanagan Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, to John R.B. Palmer (July
25, 2002, 10:13:15 AM) (on file with author).
On the other hand, one might view res judicata and collateral bar as similar, yet dis-
tinct doctrines. Under this view, one would note that resjudicata is normally driven by the
need for finality, see CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 17, at 29-31, whereas collateral bar is
driven by the need for obedience, United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 312
(1947) (Frankfurter,J., concurring). Furthermore, while "resjudicata" literally translates
to "the thing adjudicated," see BLACK's LAw DIcrIONARY 1312 (7th ed. 1999), collateral bar
often affects matters that are still in the process of being adjudicated, see, e.g., supra notes
2-4 and accompanying text. Thus a more appropriate label might be "res judicatur" (a
made-up term suggested by one Latin expert that translates to "the thing being decided,"
see E-mail from Fabidn Guevara to John R.B. Palmer (JuIly 26, 2002, 09:45:01 AM) (on file
with author)), or "res litigiosae" (a Roman law doctrine that translates to "the thing being
litigated," see BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 1312 (7th ed. 1999)). Of course, the drawback to
these labels is that they would not capture the situations in which the court order in ques-
tion has been fully adjudicated.
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same way as any other final judgment.23 However, courts issue many
orders in the preliminary stages of litigation 24 that are not final for
normal res judicata purposes.2 5 It is with respect to these non-final
orders that the impact of collateral bar is most strongly felt.
A. The Collateral Bar Rule's Fundamental Core: No Collateral
Attack on the Merits of a Court Order
At its most basic, collateral bar has long held that a person who
disobeys a court order cannot challenge the merits of that order as a
defense to criminal contempt charges. Thus, in the 1922 case of
Howat v. Kansas, the Supreme Court stressed that "[a] n injunction...
must be obeyed.., however erroneous the action of the court may be,
even if the error be in the assumption of the validity of a seeming but
void law going to the merits of the case." 26 Perhaps the most striking
example of this rule came when the Supreme Court upheld an Ala-
bama court's contempt conviction against Martin Luther King, Jr. in
Walker v. City of Birmingham.27
Birmingham, Alabama, became the focus of the civil rights move-
ment in 1963, when Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC) joined forces with Fred L. Shuttles-
worth's Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights (ACMHR) 28
in a campaign to end segregation in the city's commercial sector. 29
Birmingham was known as one of the most intransigent bastions of
segregation in the South, with its city commission, police, courts,
school board, and other city agencies all in the hands of "openly and
fervently" anti-black, populist leaders. 30 It was therefore unsurprising
Whichever position one takes, the important thing is to understand that collateral bar
fits into the general subject of collateral attack on prior judgments, and that it is similar to
the normal rules of res judicata.
23 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 & cmt. c (1982); CASAD & CLER-
MONT, supra note 17, at 50-51.
24 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (concerning preliminary injunctions and temporary re-
straining orders).
25 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 & cmt. c (1982); CASAD & CLER-
MONT, supra note 17, at 50-51.
26 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922).
27 See 388 U.S. 307, 315-21 (1967). For an excellent and comprehensive historical
account of the case and the events surrounding it, see generally ALAN F. WESTIN & BARRY
MAHONEY, THE TRIAL OF MARTIN LUTHER KING (1974).
28 The ACMHR was an offshoot of the NAACP, which was banned in Alabama at that
time. See WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 27, at 16.
29 See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 45-47 (1964); WESTIN & MAHO-
NEY, supra note 27, at 20-22, 48-49.
30 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 27, at 14. King later wrote that "[iun the entire
country there was no place to compare with Birmingham" and that "brutality directed
against Negroes was an unquestioned and unchallenged reality." KING, supra note 29, at
37, 41. Perhaps veteran New York Times reporter Harrison Salisbury best captured this at-
mosphere when he described Birmingham as a city of "fear, force and terror," in which
2002]
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when Birmingham's Commissioner of Public Safety, Eugene "Bull"
Connor,31 denied the civil rights leaders' request for a parade permit
for their demonstrations. 32 It was also unsurprising when the city ob-
tained from an Alabama court, ex parte, a temporary injunction
prohibiting King and 136 other named individuals from taking part in
the demonstrations.3 3
The injunction was most likely an unconstitutional restraint on
expression. In addition to likely being too vague and broad to survive
a First Amendment challenge, it was based directly on the city's
parade permit ordinance, which suffered from the same defects and
had been administered in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.3 4
However, at the time that the Alabama court issued the injunction,
King had less than two days before a scheduled march that he deemed
critical to the campaign's success. 35 Therefore, instead of challenging
the injunction directly, King violated it and challenged it as a defense
to his criminal contempt charges.3 6
segregation was enforced by "the whip, the razor, the gun, the bomb, the torch, the club,
the knife, the mob, the police and many branches of the state's apparatus." Harrison E.
Salisbury, Fear and Hatred Grip Birmingham, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1960, at 1. He noted that
the government had even banned a book featuring black and white rabbits, had allegedly
tapped telephones, and had opened mail, and that between 1949 and 1960 there were
twenty-two reported bombings of black churches and homes. See id. For more on Birming-
ham's troubled history, and in particular the events surrounding King's 1963 desegrega-
tion campaign, see DIANE MCWHORTER, CARRY ME HOME (2001); Robert Gaines Corley,
The Quest for Racial Harmony: Race Relations in Birmingham, Alabama, 1947-1963
(1979) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file with author).
31 Connor was notorious for his repressive police tactics and vocal opposition to de-
segregation. "[H]e exercised virtually unbridled power, 'arresting innocent citizens,
openly monitoring and occasionally harassing civil rights activists, and stridently accusing
segregation's critics of Communist sympathies."' ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, TO REDEEM THE SOUL
OF AMERICA 112 (1987) (quoting Corley, supra note 30, at 166-67). As News-week described
him, "Connor [was] as much a giant in Birmingham as the cast-iron statue of Vulcan, god
of the forge .... just outside town. Both are monuments-Vulcan to the city's steel econ-
omy and Connor to her standing as the biggest, toughest citadel of segregation left in the
Deep South." 'Bull' at Bay, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 15, 1963, at 29, 29.
32 See WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 27, at 65-66.
33 See Transcript of Record at 25-45, Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307
(1967) (No. 249) (reprinting the injunction and the affidavits on which it was based).
34 Indeed, the Supreme Court unanimously held the city ordinance unconstitutional
when it examined it in 1969. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147,
150-51, 153 (1969).
35 The judge signed the injunction on the evening of April 10, 1963, and Birmingham
officials served it on King at 1:15 AM the next morning. See WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra
note 27, at 71, 76. King had scheduled a large march for the afternoon of April 12. The
timing was important because the campaign was beginning to pick up momentum after a
slow start, see FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 31, at 121-22; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 27, at
68, and because April 12 was Good Friday, and therefore had special significance for King's
church-oriented movement, see Brief for the Petitioners at 70-71, Walker (No. 249).
36 See WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 27, at 81-84, 89-126. Aside from the fact that it
led to King's arrest (or perhaps in part because of it), the march was a huge success. The
New York Times reported it as being the "most spectacular" since the start of the campaign,
Foster Hailey, Dr. King Arrested at Birmingham, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1963, at 1, and it was
222
2002] COLLATERAL BAR AND CONTEMPT
Predictably, the Alabama courts applied their own version of the
collateral bar rule to reject King's defense.37 The trial court sen-
tenced King to five days in jail and imposed a $50 fine. 38 Thus, when
the case finally reached the U.S. Supreme Court,39 the Justices faced
the question of whether Alabama could constitutionally punish some-
one for disobeying what was likely an unconstitutional injunction.40
On one hand, the question before the court was fairly straightfor-
ward: if the injunction were unconstitutional, that would be a flaw in
its merits, and the basic core of collateral bar would clearly preclude
King from challenging those merits as a defense to criminal contempt
charges. a t King should have challenged the injunction directly before
violating it. On the other hand, an openly segregationist state court
system had convicted a national civil rights hero for demonstrating in
followed by other marches throughout the Easter weekend, see WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra
note 27, at 87-88. By keeping the campaign's momentum going, and by managing to
garner direct intervention from the Federal Department of Justice, King eventually was
able to bring Birmingham's business community to the negotiating table, and ultimately to
force them to agree to desegregation in certain areas. See id. at 142-50 (noting, however,
that the agreement was still a compromise, and that many people criticized it for not going
far enough). More broadly, the momentum in Birmingham contributed to the national
civil rights movement and, in particular, put pressure on Congress ultimately to pass the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. at 155-56.
37 Not only was collateral bar an established rule in Alabama, but the Alabama Su-
preme Court was notorious for using state procedural grounds to defeat civil rights cases,
and the panel ofjustices who heard King's case were all ardent segregationists. See WESTIN
& MAHONEY, supra note 27, at 158, 179. One of the members of the panel, the court's
ChiefJustice, had been quoted as bragging, "I'm for segregation in every phase of life ....
I would rather close every school from the highest to the lowest before I would go to school
with colored people." See id. at 179 (internal quotation marks omitted).
38 See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 181 So.2d 493, 502-03 (Ala. 1966) (affirming the
trial court decision); Transcript of Record at 419-25, Walker (No. 249) (reprinting the
Alabama trial court decision); WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 27, at 142, 180-83.
39 The Alabama Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in March 1963, but did not
announce its decision until December 1965. See Transcript of Record at 23-24, 447-48,
Walker (No. 249). This delay may have affected the Supreme Court's ultimate decision. As
Professors Westin and Mahoney write:
If the Birmingham contempt case had reached the U.S. Supreme Court in
1964 or 1965, when memories of Bull Connor's police dogs were still fresh
and national support for civil rights groups was at an all-time high, it is hard
to resist the conclusion that the justices would have found a way to void the
convictions of the Birmingham leaders.
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 27, at 161. But the national mood had changed by the
time the case finally reached the Supreme Court, as large-scale violence replaced King's
nonviolent civil disobedience. The summer of 1965 saw riots in the Watts area of Los
Angeles and Chicago's West Side. See id. at 177-78, 192. These were repeated the follow-
ing summer in Chicago, Cleveland, and San Francisco, the former two cities requiring
National Guard troops to restore order. Id. at 200. Thus, it was not an ideal time to be
asking the Supreme Court to decide a case in which the "rule of law" arguments cut in
favor of the opposing side. In fact, King's lawyers recognized this and structured their
arguments accordingly. See id. at 219-20.
40 See Walker, 388 U.S. at 337-38 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
41 See Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922).
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violation of a highly questionable injunction. As King's attorneys
stressed, timing was key to the demonstrations: "The injunction ...
was calculated and effective to interrupt the momentum of [the civil
rights leaders'] effort to arouse the conscience of the community and
the nation, halting their activities before they could build a broader
base of support for their assault on segregation .... "42 Obeying the
injunction during the time necessary to appeal it would have broken
the campaign's momentum. In addition, it would have prevented
King fiom demonstrating on Good Friday and Easter Sunday, "days of
special sacramental significance on which church-oriented organiza-
tions could hope to attract broad attention to their programs and pro-
tests. '43  Thus, the injunction "subjected [King's] activities to
Commissioner Connor's discretion at precisely the moment when re-
pression could be most crippling. '"4 4
Nonetheless, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the
Alabama ruling.4 5 The Court acknowledged that the defendants had
raised substantial constitutional issues, 46 but it found no fault with
Alabama's collateral bar rule.47 In fact, the Court noted that the Ala-
bama rule was identical to its federal counterpart. 48
B. Twentieth Century Expansion: No Collateral Attack on the
Rendering Court's Authority
Historically, resjudicata and collateral bar affected only collateral
attacks on a judgment's merits. 49 However, in the beginning of the
42 Brief for the Petitioners at 70, Walker (No. 249).
43 Id. at 70-71.
44 Id. at 71. The Department ofJustice also intervened on King's behalf, arguing that
the Court should not apply the collateral bar rule to a void order that "broadly suppresses
the exercise of First Amendment rights, in a context that permits no effective alternate
means of expression and no timely opportunity to obtain relief from the ban." Memoran-
dum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Walker (No. 249) (drafted, in part, by
then-Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall).
45 Walker, 388 U.S. at 320-21.
46 See id. at 316-18; see also Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51
(1969) (overturning, without a single dissent, the Alabama ordinance on which the injunc-
tion was based).
47 Walker, 388 U.S. at 315.
48 See id. at 321 n.16.
49 See, e.g., Ex parteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 143 (1908) (noting that a person could not
be punished for disobeying an order issued by a court lacking jurisdiction); In re Sawyer,
124 U.S. 200, 220 (1888) ("Where a court has jurisdiction ... whether its decision be
correct or otherwise, its judgment, until reversed, is regarded as binding in every other
court: but, if it act without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities."
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 718, 726 (1885)
("When ... a court.., undertakes . .. to punish a man for refusing to comply with an
order which that court had no authority to make, the order itself, being without jurisdic-
tion, is void, and the order punishing for the contempt is equally void."); CHAFEE, supra
note 7, at 296-300 ("[T]he situation is entirely different if the court had no jurisdiction to
decide the case and render the decree. Then the judge's order is void since he had no
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twentieth century, res judicata expanded to limit the bases of collat-
eral attack on the rendering court's authority. The major develop-
ment was the doctrine of 'jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction,"
which posits that a court's determination of its own jurisdiction is it-
self res judicata, and therefore not subject to collateral attack. 50
The doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction limits the
availability of collateral attack on territorial jurisdiction and notice to
situations in which the issues were neither waived nor litigated in the
prior proceeding. 51 Even apart from this doctrine, courts usually
deem that a party waives any objections to territorial jurisdiction and
notice by simply appearing in an action. 52 Although a party may
sometimes make a special appearance to challenge territorial jurisdic-
tion or notice without waiving subsequent objections, 53 doing so re-
quires the actual litigation of those issues and thereby makes them res
judicata in collateral proceedings under the doctrine ofjurisdiction to
determine jurisdiction. 54 Thus, a party may collaterally attack territo-
rial jurisdiction or notice only if the party never appeared at all-even
by special appearance-in the prior proceeding. 55
The doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction goes even
further in limiting the availability of collateral attack on subject-matter
jurisdiction. It precludes attack not only in cases in which subject-
matter jurisdiction was litigated in the prior proceeding, but also in
cases in which it was not litigated.56 The doctrine holds that simply by
coming to a decision, a court has necessarily-even if only implicitly-
determined that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter. 57 That de-
termination is res judicata in collateral proceedings.58 Thus, even if a
party never appeared in the prior proceeding, the party is usually pre-
cluded from collaterally attacking the court's subject-matter
jurisdiction.
power to make it; and any punishment for violating a void order is equally void."); Edward
P. Krugman, Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87
YALE L.J. 164, 165-71 (1977).
50 See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111-14 (1963); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v.
Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376-78 (1940); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's
Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 524-27 (1931). See generally CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 17, at
263-72; Bennett Boskey & Robert Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack: October Term,
1939, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 1006 (1940); Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence ofJurisdictionalRese-
quencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 57-63 (2001); Krugman, supra note 49,
at 171-81.
51 CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 17, at 266-68.
52 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 1 & cmt. a (1982); CASAD & CLERMONT,
supra note 17, at 266.
53 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 10 cmt. b (1982).
54 See id. § 10(2).
55 CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 17, at 268.
56 Id. at 268-71.
57 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 & cmt. d (1982).
58 See id.; CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 17, at 268-71.
2002]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
However, courts have carved out a few extremely narrow excep-
tions to the doctrine. For instance, in Kalb v. Feuerstein, the Supreme
Court held that a party could collaterally attack the subject-matter ju-
risdiction of a state court that lacked jurisdiction due to federal pre-
emption.59 The Court reasoned that to preclude collateral attack in
such a case would undermine the authority of the federal courts. 60
The Second Restatement of Judgments places this holding within a
more general exception that exists when "[a] llowing the judgment to
stand would substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal or
agency of government." 61 The Second Restatement also describes two
other exceptions as existing when "[t] he subject matter of the [prior]
action was so plainly beyond the court's jurisdiction that its entertain-
ing the action was a manifest abuse of authority,"62 or when "[t]he
judgment was rendered by a court lacking capability to make an ade-
quately informed determination of a question concerning its own ju-
risdiction and as a matter of procedural fairness the party seeking to
avoid the judgment should have opportunity belatedly to attack the
court's subject matter jurisdiction."63
The expansion of resjudicata has substantially limited the availa-
bility of collateral attack on finaljudgments in general, but what about
its effect with regard to collateral attack on court orders-final or oth-
erwise-in criminal contempt proceedings?
First, the normal rules of res judicata may be directly applicable
in many cases: jurisdictional findings by the court that issued an order
may be sufficiently final for the purposes of res judicata so as to pre-
clude collateral attack.64 In this regard, the availability of collateral
attack on territorial jurisdiction and notice should be the same as for
any other type ofjudgment: if a party appears in the prior proceeding,
the party waives any objections to these issues;65 if the party makes a
59 308 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1940).
60 See id.
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 12(2) (1982).
62 Id. § 12(1).
63 Id. § 12(3). For earlier formulations of the exceptions to jurisdiction to determine
jurisdiction and discussions thereof, see generally Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 114 & n.12
(1963) (discussing the exceptions in dicta); RESTATEMENT OFJUDGMENTS § 10 (1942); RE-
STATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 451(2) (Supp. 1948); Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap:
Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491
(1967); Dan B. Dobbs, TheDecline ofJurisdiction by Consent, 40 N.C. L. REV. 49, 54-58 (1961)
[hereinafter Dobbs, Consent]; Dan B. Dobbs, Trial Court Error as an Excess of Jurisdiction, 43
TEX. L. REV. 854 (1965); Dan B. Dobbs, The Validation of Void judgments: The Bootstrap Princi-
p/e (pts. 1 & 2), 53 VA. L. REV. 1003, 1241 (1967); Krugman, supra note 49, at 175-81.
64 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 & cmt. c (1982); CASAD & CLER-
MONT, supra note 17, at 250-51.
65 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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special appearance, then he or she has litigated the issues and the
normal rules of res judicata preclude subsequent collateral attack. 66
What about collateral attack on subject-matter jurisdiction?
Here, the normal rules of resjudicata preclude certain attacks even if
the issue was not previously litigated, but only if the judgment is fi-
nal.67 Thus, the normal rules of res judicata themselves would not
necessarily preclude collateral attack on the subject-matter jurisdic-
tion of a court that has issued a temporary restraining order or prelim-
66 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. One open question is whether a
person who was not a party to the original proceeding can collaterally attack the original
court's territorial jurisdiction over himself or herself in subsequent proceedings as a de-
fense to criminal contempt charges. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals answered this
question in the negative in In reNovak, 932 F.2d 1397 (lth Cir. 1991). In that case, it was
clear that the court had personal jurisdiction over the parties and over the defendant's
non-party insurer, which was controlling the litigation. See id. at 1399-1402. During pre-
trial settlement negotiations, however, the trial judge became frustrated with the fact that
the defendant's attorney did not have power to enter a settlement agreement without the
insurer's express approval. See id. at 1399. The judge therefore ordered one of the in-
surer's employees, whom he believed had such power, Roger Novak, to personally appear
in court on a certain date. See id. When Novak failed to appear, the judge fined him $500
for criminal contempt. See id. at 1400. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the col-
lateral bar rule precluded any collateral attack on territorial jurisdiction other than an
attack on the court's jurisdiction over the parties to the underlying action. See id. at
1402-03. Because the court found that the trial court had jurisdiction over the parties, it
declined to consider whether it had jurisdiction over Novak. See id. at 1403.
The court offered no explanation as to why a non-party should be given such harsh
treatment as compared to a party. While a party faced with a court order may choose to
stay home and litigate territorial jurisdiction during subsequent criminal contempt pro-
ceedings, cf Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931) ("[The
party] had the election not to appear at all. If, in the absence of appearance, the court had
proceeded to judgment, and the present suit had been brought thereon, respondent could
have raised and tried out the issue in the present action .... "), the Eleventh Circuit's
holding requires a non-party anywhere in the world to appear in the initial proceeding if
she ever wants to challenge the rendering court's jurisdiction over her person. In some
situations, the court may not need jurisdiction over a non-party to bind that non-party to a
particular order. For instance, a court may sometimes hold a non-party in contempt for
aiding and abetting a party to violate a court order, regardless of the court's jurisdiction
over the non-party. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 17, at 157-58. However, in cases in
which a court needs personal jurisdiction over a non-party before it can bind it, that non-
party should be able to collaterally attack that jurisdiction, as long as he or she neither
waived nor litigated the issue in the prior proceeding. Cf id.; supra notes 52-54 and ac-
companying text.
The Eleventh Circuit's holding appears especially harsh given that the Supreme Court
has indicated in dicta that a non-party has no standing to challenge a court's lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction over the parties to an action. See United States Catholic Conference v.
Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1988) ("We are not confronted
here with a nonparty witness attempting to challenge its civil contempt by raising matters
in which it has no legitimate interest, for instance the District Court's lack of personal
jurisdiction over the parties .... "). Although the Court might back off from such a rule if
it were actually faced with the issue, the Supreme Court's current dicta, combined with the
Eleventh Circuit's holding, would effectively bar a non-party from challenging personal
jurisdiction at all.
67 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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inary injunction. The courts have relied on collateral bar to fill this
gap.
1. United States v. Shipp
The Supreme Court first began expanding collateral bar into the
jurisdictional realm in an unusual 1906 case involving disobedience to
one of its own orders. In United States v. Shipp, the Court had ordered
a Tennessee sheriff, Joseph Shipp, to stay the execution of one of his
prisoners while it considered the prisoner's habeas corpus appeal. 6
Instead of obeying the order, Shipp allowed a mob to drag the pris-
oner out of his cell, hang him from a nearby bridge, and then shoot
him to death. 69 This incident infuriated the Supreme Court Justices
and led the Attorney General to charge Shipp with criminal
contempt.
7 0
In his defense, Shipp argued that the Supreme Court's order was
invalid for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 7' Based on controlling
precedent (which at that time had not yet extended the Bill of
Rights's applicability to the states), Shipp argued that the prisoner's
habeas corpus petition had failed to raise any constitutional claims,
and that the federal courts therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear it.72
In the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, he argued, the Supreme
Court's order was invalid and could be disobeyed with impunity. 73
68 203 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1906). For a narrative history of this case, see MARK CUR-
RIDEN & LEROY PHILLIPS, JR., CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY LYNCHING
THAT LAUNCHED 100 YEARS OF FEDERALISM (1999). The prisoner, Ed Johnson, was a black
man convicted of raping a white woman in what appears to have been a seriously flawed
trial, largely driven by racist mob violence and the sheriff's own political ambitions. See id.
at 30, 33-37, 40-129. Although Johnson's habeas corpus petition had been denied by a
federal district court, the Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal from that denial. See id.
at 3-19, 152-68, 192-97.
69 See CURRIDEN & PHILLIPS, supra note 68, at 200-14. The mob included uniformed
police officers, one of whom cut offJohnson's finger as a souvenir. See id. at 217. One of
the leaders pinned a large note toJohnson's body, reading: "To Justice Harlan. Come get
your nigger now." Id. at 214. The local police did not even file a report on the lynching,
let alone investigate or make any arrests. See id. at 217.
70 See id. at 221-24, 230-32, 253-54. The New York Times described the mob's "open
defiance of the Supreme Court" as having "no parallel in . . . history" and as having
"shocked the members of the [C]ourt beyond anything that has ever happened in their
experience on the bench." Lynching Mob to Feel Supreme Court's Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
1906, at 1. Ultimately, the Attorney General filed an information charging Sheriff Shipp,
his deputies, and sixteen other people who had participated in the lynching with criminal
contempt. See United States v. Shipp, 215 U.S. 580, 580-81 (1909); CURRIDEN & PHILLIPS,
supra note 68, at 253-54. It was the first time in history that anyone had been charged with
disobeying a Supreme Court order. See id. at 270 (quoting then-Solicitor General Henry
M. Hoyt).
71 See CURRIDEN & PHILLIPS, supra note 68, at 260.
72 See id. at 274-75.
73 See id. at 260.
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However, the Court did not need to reach the question of
whether the habeas petition raised constitutional issues to reject unan-
imously Shipp's argument.74 Speaking for the Court, Justice Holmes
wrote:
[E]ven if... this court had no jurisdiction of the appeal, this court,
and this court alone, could decide that such was the law. It and it
alone necessarily had jurisdiction to decide whether the case was
properly before it. . . . Until its judgment declining jurisdiction
should be announced, it had authority from the necessity of the
case to make orders to preserve the existing conditions and the sub-
ject of the petition .... 75
The Court then proceeded to try7 6 and convict Shipp.77 As the
attorney for the murdered prisoner later commented, "The very rule
of law upon which this country was founded and on which the future
of this nation rests ha[d] been enforced with the might of our highest
tribunal."78
Many commentators minimize Shipp's importance to the collat-
eral bar rule, stressing the unusual nature of the case. For example,
some interpret the case as standing for the limited proposition that a
party cannot collaterally attack subject-matter jurisdiction when the
"violation of the order operated in itself to defeat the jurisdiction of
the court, such as by destroying the object of the dispute and thereby
making the case moot."79 Others stress that Shipp is unusual in that it
involved contempt of an order issued by the Supreme Court itself, as
opposed to a district court, 0 and that the disobedient party was a
court officer, as opposed to a private citizen.81
74 EightJustices made the decision, with the newly appointed justice Moody recusing
himself because he had himself filed the information in the case during his tenure as
United States Attorney General. See id. at 264, 283.
75 United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906).
76 This was the first time that the Supreme Court had ever conducted trial. See CuR-
RIDEN & PHILLIPS, supra note 68, at 286. After requesting proposals from both sides as to
how to proceed, the Court appointed its deputy clerk to preside over the evidentiary hear-
ings and thereby save the Justices from that burden. See id. at 286-87. These hearings were
conducted in the United States Circuit Courtroom in Chattanooga over the course of
about four-and-a-half months. See id. at 292-316. The Supreme Court then heard oral
arguments from both sides before finding Sheriff Shipp and five other defendants guilty.
See United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386, 425 (1909); CURRIDEN & PHILLIPS, supra note 68, at
319-34.
77 See CURRIDEN & PHILLIPS, supra note 68, at 334-35. Shipp's sentence, however, was
only ninety days. See id.
78 Id. at 336 (reprinting the attorney's November 1909 statement to the Atlanta
Independent).
79 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3537, at
541-42 (2d ed. 1984).
80 See Hugh B. Cox, The Void Order and the Duty to Obey, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 86, 101-02
(1948).
81 See CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 376 n.24.
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One can read the opinion more broadly, however. Although Jus-
tice Holmes did note that the prisoner's murder made it impossible to
decide the jurisdictional question, he made it clear that it was his ex-
panded version of the collateral bar rule, not the murder, that made it
unnecessary to consider whether the Court had lacked jurisdiction. 82
Furthermore, nothing in the opinion itself suggests that the ruling
would not apply equally to district court orders or to orders directed
at private citizens.
2. United States v. United Mine Workers
Whatever the actual limits of the Shipp holding, the Supreme
Court signaled its broad implications in United States v. United Mine
Workers.83 The case arose after the federal government took over most
of the nation's bituminous coal mines in 194684 and then became em-
broiled in a dispute with the United Mine Workers and its charismatic
leader, John L. Lewis, over a wage agreement. 85 When discussions
broke down, the government sued for declaratory relief and, ex parte,
persuaded a federal district court to issue a temporary restraining or-
der forbidding the United Mine Workers and Lewis from terminating
the agreement, encouraging a strike, or taking any action to "interfere
with the court's jurisdiction and its determination of the case." 86
It was not clear, however, that the court had jurisdiction to issue
such an order. In particular, the Norris-LaGuardia and Clayton Acts
appeared expressly to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction to issue
82 Justice Holmes declared: "The murder of the petitioner has made it impossible to
decide [the jurisdictional question], and what we have said makes it unnecessary to pass
upon it as a preliminary to deciding the question before us." United States v. Shipp, 203
U.S. 563, 573-74 (1906)(emphasis added). The phrase "what we have said" refers to
Holmes's previous paragraph, quoted above in the text accompanying note 75, in which he
wrote that the Court had jurisdiction to make orders to preserve existing conditions while
deciding its own jurisdiction. Thus, it was not the murder of the petitioner, but rather the
collateral bar rule itself, that made it unnecessary to consider whether the Court had juris-
diction over the appeal.
83 See 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
84 The government did this to prevent labor disturbances and protect the national
economy during the transition to peace after World War II. See Exec. Order No. 9728, 11
Fed. Reg. 5593 (May 21, 1946).
85 Specifically, Lewis claimed that pursuant to the so-called Krug-Lewis agreement be-
tween the mine workers and the government, either party, on notice, could require the
other party to attend negotiations and could terminate the agreement. Based on this inter-
pretation, Lewis gave notice that he intended to renegotiate wages, hours, rules, and other
matters. The government, on the other hand, disagreed that the Krug-Lewis Agreement
contained any such terms; therefore, it denied that Lewis had the power to require renego-
tiation. See United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 264-65; Transcript of Record at 26-29, United
Mine Workers (Nos. 759, 760, 781, 782, 811).
86 See United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 266-67, 267 n.12; see also Transcript of Record at
60-61, United Mine Workers (Nos. 759, 760, 781, 782, 811) (reprinting the temporary re-
straining order); Louis Stark, Contract Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1946, at 1 (reporting the
temporary restraining order).
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restraining orders in labor disputes.87 If this were the case, it would
not mean that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, but
only that it lacked what is known as equity jurisdiction-jurisdiction to
issue a particular order.8 8 Still, the prevailing view at the time was that
equity jurisdiction was analogous to subject-matter jurisdiction in
terms of its effect on a court's authority to render judgment.89
In any event, the United Mine Workers did not wait to test the
court's jurisdiction directly. On the same day that the court issued its
order, the mine workers began a walkout which quickly turned into a
full-fledged strike, 90 shutting down most of the nation's bituminous
coal production. 91 In response, the court found Lewis and the United
Mine Workers guilty of both civil and criminal contempt, and fined
them $10,000 and $3,500,000, respectively. 92
87 For example, Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act states: "No court of the United
States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent
injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person
or persons participating or interested in such dispute .... " Pub. L. No. 72-65, § 4, 47 Stat.
70, 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)). Section 20 of the Clayton Act states
that, in cases between employers and employees, "no . . .restraining order or injunction
shall prohibit any person or persons.., from.., recommending, advising, or persuading
others" to strike. Pub. L. No. 63-212, § 20, 38 Stat. 730, 738 (1914) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§52 (1994)).
88 For a discussion of equity jurisdiction, see CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 301-03; Stanley
L. Sabel, Equity Jurisdiction in the United States Courts with Reference to Consent Receiverships, 19
IOWA L. REv. 406 (1934).
89 See CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 303-04, 320-21. In contrast to the prevailing view,
Professor Chafee argued persuasively that equity jurisdiction is really a question of whether
the court has made a correct decision to grant equitable relief. Thus, he argued, equity
"jurisdiction" is really a question of merits, not jurisdiction. See id. at 304-21.
90 See United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 267; A.H. Raskin, Miners in Exodus, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 1946, at 1 [hereinafter Raskin, Miners in Exodus]; A.H. Raskin, 33,000 Miners Halt,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1946, at 1 [hereinafter Raskin, Premature Action]. Although Lewis did
not specifically call for the strike after the court issued its order, he had already instructed
the miners to strike in the absence of any subsequent countermanding instruction. See
Raskin, Premature Action, supra.
91 See United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 267. For a sense of the strike's far-reaching and
potentially massive effects, see Alabama Coal Off85%, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1946, at 24; B. &
0. Cancels 23 Trains, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1946, at 24; Brownout Plans Ready, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
21, 1946, at 24; Canada Curtails Coal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1946, at 2; New Dimout Seen if Strike
Endures, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1946, at 2; ODT Makes 25% Travel Cut on Coal-Burning Rail-
roads, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1946, at 1; Railroads Curtail Service in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
1946, at 25; A.H. Raskin, Grip Is Tightening, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1946, at 1; Lawrence
Resner, Schedules Change, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1946, at 1; Tonnage Famine in Port Is Feared,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1946, at 1; 25,000,000 May Be Idle if Coal Strike Is Prolonged, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 1946, at 1. The War Department was even prepared to send troops into the
coalfields if requested. Raskin, Miners in Exodus, supra note 90.
92 See United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 267-69. The fine came after a somewhat heated
seven-day trial, during which Lewis spent much of his time glowering at the audience and
had a brief standoff with the bailiff over whether he needed to remove his hat in the
courtroom. See Lewis Runs Afoul of Court Bailiff N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1946, at 2 ("[After the
judge had already] taken his place on the bench, Mr. Lewis stalked in with his large black
hat pulled firmly down to his eyebrows."). Lewis also almost incurred a second contempt
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:215
Lewis and the United Mine Workers temporarily called off the
strike93 and appealed their convictions. 94 When their cases came
before the Supreme Court,95 they collaterally attacked the order by
arguing that the Norris-LaGuardia and Clayton Acts deprived the dis-
trict court of equity jurisdiction to enjoin the strike. 96 While a major-
ity of five Justices rejected that argument, a separate majority
(composed of three of the first five plus two others) agreed that even
if the district court did lack jurisdiction under those Acts, it could still
hold the United Mine Workers and Lewis in criminal contempt for
their disobedience. 97
The Court relied on two lines of cases to support its holding.
First, it cited United States v. Shipp98 and a Fifth Circuit decision, Carter
v. United States,99 to support the propositions that a court, in the pro-
cess of determining its own subject-matter jurisdiction over a contro-
versy, has the power to issue orders to preserve existing conditions,
and that these orders must be obeyed regardless of the court's ulti-
mate determination. 100 Second, the Court cited Howat v. Kansas'01
and two similar cases 10 2 for the older proposition that a party cannot
collaterally attack a court order's merits. 10 3 The facts in United Mine
Workers presented aspects of both lines of cases: the district court had
subject-matter jurisdiction, but it was in the process of determining
whether the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts had deprived it of eq-
citation when he accused Assistant Attorney General John F. Sonnett of lying. See Louis
Stark, Defense Is Enraged, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1946, at 1.
9- See MAIER B. Fox, UNITED WE STAND: THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 1890-
1990, at 408 (1990); Lewis Yields, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1946, at El.
94 See United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 269.
95 As soon as Lewis and the United Mine Workers filed notices of appeal, the govern-
ment petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, which the Court granted. See id.
96 See id.; Brief for United Mine Workers of America and John L. Lewis at 12-43, United
Mine Workers (Nos. 759, 760, 781, 782, 811).
97 See United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 262-335. The Justices' opinions broke down as
follows: Justices Vinson, Reed, and Burton believed that the district court had jurisdiction,
and that even if it lacked jurisdiction, the defendants could be held in criminal contempt
by virtue of collateral bar. Justices Jackson and Frankfurter believed that the district court
lacked jurisdiction, but that the defendants could be held in criminal contempt anyway by
virtue of collateral bar. Justices Black and Douglas believed that the district court had
jurisdiction, and they did not address the issue of collateral bar. However, they believed
that a criminal contempt sanction was excessive under the circumstances of the case. Fi-
nally, Justices Murphy and Rutledge believed that the district court lacked jurisdiction, and
that therefore the defendants could not be punished. See id. at 262-385; CHAFEE, supra
note 7, at 365-67.
98 203 U.S. 563 (1906).
99 135 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1943).
10( See United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 290-93.
101 258 U.S. 181 (1922).
102 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co, 221 U.S. 418 (1911); Worden v. Searls, 121
U.S. 14 (1887).
103 See United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 293-94.
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uity jurisdiction to issue the injunction.104 Therefore, the Supreme
Court "insist[ed] upon the same duty of obedience" that it had de-
manded in the previous cases. 10
5
The Court's holding, however, has been a source of confusion for
the lower federal courts, probably due to the fact that it dealt with
equity rather than subject-matter jurisdiction. Although they have dis-
cussed the issue of subject-matterjurisdiction (in the context of collat-
eral bar) only in dicta, lower federal courts often confidently state that
a party can collaterally attack subject-matter jurisdiction as a defense
to criminal contempt.10 6 In one such case, the Ninth Circuit re-
marked that United Mine Workers "is now frequently cited for the pro-
position that a lack ofjurisdiction is a complete defense to an order of
contempt," although it conceded that "some commentators have in-
terpreted the case as standing for the opposite principle." 10 7
Indeed, commentators have so interpreted United Mine Workers,' 0
and their's is the more accurate position. By relying on Shipp, the
United Mine Workers Court implicitly endorsed an expansion of the col-
lateral bar rule to limit collateral attacks on subject-matter jurisdic-
tion. Although its holding technically dealt with equity jurisdiction,'0 9
it clearly viewed equity and subject-matter jurisdiction as analogous
for the purposes of collateral bar.I1 0 This conclusion is particularly
apparent from Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, in which he
stated: "Short of an indisputable want of authority on the part of a
court, the very existence of a court presupposes its power to entertain
a controversy, if only to decide, after deliberation, that it has no power
over the particular controversy."11'
This interpretation is also supported by dicta from the United
Mine Workers majority opinion in which the Court suggested a narrow
exception 1 2 to its rule. The Court stated that the district court "had
104 Id. at 293-95.
105 Id. at 294.
106 See cases cited supra note 8.
107 Dep't of Labor OSHA v. Hern Iron Works, Inc. (In re Establishment Inspection of
Hem Iron Works, Inc.), 881 F.2d 722, 726 & n.12 (9th Cir. 1989).
108 See, e.g., 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 79, § 3537, at 543.
109 See United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 314.
110 As noted above at note 89, one could view equity jurisdiction as a question of mer-
its, not of validity. In that case, one might argue that the United Mine Workers holding was
simply that a party cannot collaterally attack the merits of a court order to avoid criminal
contempt. See CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 374-79. However, that rule was already firmly estab-
lished, see supra note 49 and accompanying text, and if that was all the Court intended to
say, then it would not have needed to rely on Shipp and Carter.
111 United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 310.
112 This Note uses the term "exception," as opposed to "condition," to indicate an
element that the defendant would have the burden to prove in a criminal contempt pro-
ceeding. To make out a prima facie case for criminal contempt, the prosecutor simply
must show that (1) there was a reasonably specific court order, (2) the defendant knew of
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the power to preserve existing conditions while it was determining its
own authority to grant injunctive relief' but that "a different result
would follow were the question of jurisdiction frivolous and not sub-
stantial."' 1 3 This statement looks very similar to the first of the narrow
grounds for collateral attack on subject-matter jurisdiction laid out in
the Second Restatement of Judgments, which covers cases in which
"[t]he subject matter of the [prior] action was so plainly beyond the
court's jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a manifest
abuse of authority." 114 Understood this way, it looks as though the
rule established by Shipp and United Mine Workers mirrors the normal
rules of res judicata.115
This mirroring is further exemplified by two subsequent cases in
which the Supreme Court carved out another narrow exception to the
collateral bar rule to allow parties to collaterally attack subject-matter
jurisdiction as a defense to criminal contempt charges. In Amalga-
mated Ass'n of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees, Division
988 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board'16 and In re Green,"1 7 the
Court held that parties could make such attacks after disobeying state
court orders in cases in which the state courts were deprived of sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction by virtue of federal preemption. ' 8 This ex-
ception clearly mirrors the Kalb v. Feuerstein exception to jurisdiction
to determine jurisdiction with respect to judgments in general. 119
C. Civil Versus Criminal Contempt: When Is the Attack
Collateral?
Thus far, this Note has discussed collateral bar's effects only in
criminal contempt proceedings. Yet in many cases, a party's disobedi-
ence leads to a civil contempt judgment, either instead of or in addi-
tion to a criminal contempt judgment. Does collateral bar prevent a
party from challenging a court order in order to avoid civil contempt?
this order, and (3) the defendant willfully violated the order. See United States v. Young,
107 F.3d 903, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 834 (2d Cir. 1995).
(Courts discuss these elements in different ways, sometimes appearing to combine one or
more of them. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 716 (1993); Young, 107 F.3d
at 907.)
113 United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 293. This statement appears to track the language
of the Shipp Court, which also stressed that the jurisdictional question before it was not
"frivolous or a mere pretense." United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906).
114 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 12(1) (1982). I am indebted to Professor
Kevin M. Clermont for pointing out this similarity.
115 See supra text accompanying notes 56-63.
116 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
117 369 U.S. 689 (1962).
118 See Green, 369 U.S. at 692 & n.l., 693; Amalgamated Ass'n, 340 U.S. at 399. Indeed,
the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires state courts to
hear such challenges. See Green, 369 U.S. at 692 & n.], 693.
119 See supra text accompanying note 59.
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The answer is clearly no, but the Supreme Court's precedent on this
subject requires some further explanation.
In United Mine Workers, the Supreme Court, relying on existing
precedent, indicated that collateral bar would not apply to a civil con-
tempt proceeding. It explained:
It does not follow... that simply because a defendant may be pun-
ished for criminal contempt for disobedience of an order later set
aside on appeal, that the plaintiff in the action may profit by way of
a fine imposed in a simultaneous proceeding for civil contempt
based upon a violation of the same order.' 20
The Court later reaffirmed this proposition as part of its holding
in United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc.121
However, the line between civil and criminal contempt has always
been somewhat fuzzy, 122 and the Court has slightly shifted the line's
location subsequent to its decision in Abortion Rights.123
Courts generally draw the line between civil and criminal con-
tempt based on the "character and purpose" of the sanction im-
120 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 294-95 (1947).
121 487 U.S. 72, 78 (1988). In that case, the Supreme Court faced non-party witnesses,
whom a judge had held in civil contempt for failure to comply with subpoenas duces te-
cum. Id. at 75. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. (ARM), had sued to revoke the Roman
Catholic Church's tax-exempt status, on the ground that the Church had participated in
political activities in violation of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 74. ARM had served
subpoenas on the United States Catholic Conference and the National Conference of
Catholic Bishops as non-party witnesses, seeking documents to support their claim. See id.
at 74-75. For three years, the Conferences refused to comply, and a judge finally found
them to be in civil contempt and liable for fines of $50,000 for each day of further non-
compliance. See Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Baker (In re United States Catholic
Conference), 824 F.2d 156, 159-60 (2d Cir. 1987).
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Conferences argued
that the trial court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying controversy.
Id. at 160. The court of appeals rejected this argument, basing its decision not directly on
the collateral bar rule but instead on the conclusion that non-party witnesses lack standing
to raise subject-matter jurisdiction on appeal. Id. at 165. Its reasoning, however, was partly
based on an interpretation of United Mine Workers that would have extended the collateral
bar rule to cover civil as well as criminal contempt. See id. at 160-67.
The Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, holding
that a non-party witness does have standing to challenge subject-matter jurisdiction on ap-
peal of a civil contempt judgment. See Catholic Conference, 487 U.S. at 80. In doing so, the
Court clearly held that the collateral bar rule does not apply to civil contempt. See id. at
78-80 ("When a district court elects to apply civil contempt to enforce compliance, it is
consistent with that approach to allow full consideration of the court's subject-matter
jurisdiction.").
122 See Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827 & n.3 (1994);
RONALD L. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPr POWER 49-67 (1963); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting
Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79
VA. L. REv. 1025, 1047-62 (1993); Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L.
REv. 345, 347 n.11, 349-56 (2000); Robert J. Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the
Confusion Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 677, 681-84 (1981);Joseph
Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 780 (1943).
123 See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
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posed.12 4 Criminal contempt sanctions punish parties for disobeying
court orders or otherwise disrespecting judicial authority, and seek to
deter future transgressions.1 25 Civil contempt sanctions either coerce
parties into doing or refraining from doing particular acts, 126 or com-
pensate injured parties for another party's disobedience.1 27 The civil/
criminal distinction is important because it affects the procedures re-
quired for a court to impose a sanction. A court may not impose crim-
inal contempt sanctions without the constitutional safeguards
required in any other criminal proceeding. 128 In contrast, a court im-
posing civil contempt sanctions need ensure only the constitutional
safeguards required in normal civil proceedings. 129
In 1994, however, the Supreme Court shifted the line between
civil and criminal contempt to extend the Constitution's criminal safe-
guards to a broader range of contempt cases. 13 0 In International
Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, the Court held that, in addition
to the "character and purpose" test, and especially in situations in
which that test yields ambiguous results, a judge may need to follow
criminal contempt procedures before imposing sanctions for out-of-
court disobedience to complex injunctions. 131 The Court's rationale
was that proving such contempts generally requires "elaborate and re-
liable factfinding,"' 32 that such contempts "do not obstruct the court's
ability to adjudicate the proceedings before it,' 3 3 and that adjudicat-
124 See Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911).
t25 See id.; Livingston, supra note 122, at 353-54.
126 See Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441-42; Livingston, supra note 122, at 351-52 (labeling this
type of contempt as "coercive civil contempt"). Ajudge usually employs coercion by im-
prisoning or regularly fining the party until he complies. Because the party can end the
sanction at any time by complying, it is often said that the disobedient party "carries the
keys of his prison in his own pocket." Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828 (quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at
442).
127 See Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441-42; Livingston, supra note 122, at 351-52 (labeling this
type of contempt as "remedial civil contempt").
128 See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 826-27. These safeguards include the right to counsel, see
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925), the right to a
jury when being tried for a "serious" offense, see U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194, 198-200 (1968), the right against self-incrimination, see U.S. CONST. amend.
V; Gompers, 221 U.S. at 444, the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, see U.S. CONST.
amend. V; Gompers, 221 U.S. at 444, and the right against doublejeopardy, see U.S. CONST.
amend. V; In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943).
As Livingston notes, however, some states, see, e.g., State ex rel. Chassing v. Mummert,
887 S.W.2d 573, 579 n.3 (Mo. 1994), continue to hold that full criminal protections are not
always required before a judge may impose criminal contempt. See Livingston, supra note
122, at 353 n.39.
129 See Livingston, supra note 122, at 352 & nn.32-33, 353 & n.38.
130 See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 838-39; Livingston, supra note 122, at 345-47, 378-90, 401.
131 See 512 U.S. at 833-34.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 834.
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ing such contempts without a jury creates a "substantial" risk that a
judge will erroneously deprive a party of her rights.134
Whatever Bagwelts merits for ensuring that contemnors receive
adequate procedural protection, the case could have the unintended
consequence of extending the applicability of the collateral bar rule.
This result would clearly be a mistake, because the Supreme Court has
never indicated that collateral bar's scope hinges on the complexity of
an injunction or the availability of procedural protections. Rather,
the Court's language in United Mine Workers suggests that collateral
bar's scope turns more on the character and purpose of the
sanction. 13 5
In fact, if one looks at collateral bar in the context of collateral
attacks on judgments in general, the reason that the rule does not
apply to civil contempt-as defined by the "character and purpose"
test-becomes much clearer: when a party attacks a court order to
avoid coercive and compensatory sanctions, he or she is not seeking
simply to avoid the effects of the order, but rather to overturn the
order itself. If the order falls, there is nothing to coerce the defen-
dant into doing, and there is no injury to other parties requiring com-
pensation. Such an attack appears to be more in the nature of a
direct attack than a collateral one, 13 6 and so, by definition, neither
collateral bar nor any of the other rules surrounding collateral attack
should apply. The best way to read Bagwell, therefore, is to assume
that any changes it causes to contempt procedures do not affect collat-
eral bar. In other words, if the character and purpose of a particular
sanction a court seeks to impose is coercive or compensatory, the
court should still allow the defendant to challenge the order itself,
even if the court follows criminal procedures pursuant to Bagwell.
134 Id. For a critique of Bagwelts reasoning, arguing that neutral fact-finding may be
just as necessary to proving disobedience of simple orders, see Livingston, supra note 122,
at 387-88 (giving the example of disobedience of a simple child support order over which
a complicated factual dispute might arise concerning the contemnor's ability to pay).
The Bagwell Court also relied in part on the "character and purpose" test and honed it
with regard to the prospective fines involved in the case. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 835-37.
In doing so, the Court somewhat weakened its holding with regard to the purported inde-
pendent need for criminal contempt procedures for disobedience of complex injunctions.
Furthermore, the lower courts, having a natural tendency to resist any weakening of their
own coercive powers, have tended to either ignore or distinguish Bagwell. See Livingston,
supra note 122, at 390-99. Nonetheless, Bagwell clearly indicates a new direction in the
distinction between criminal and civil contempt, which the Court might continue to pur-
sue in the future.
135 See supra text accompanying note 120.
136 See supra note 17.
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D. Summary
By viewing collateral bar in the context of collateral attack on
judgments in general, we see that the rule operates much like the
normal rules of resjudicata. A defendant in a criminal contempt pro-
ceeding is limited in his ability to collaterally attack the order he has
disobeyed in much the same way that a civil litigant is limited in his
ability to collaterally attack a final judgment. The defendant is pre-
cluded from attacking the order's merits. The defendant is also pre-
cluded from attacking the rendering court's assertion of personal
jurisdiction or the adequacy of notice, unless he never appeared at all
before the rendering court. Finally, the defendant is precluded from
attacking the rendering court's subject-matter jurisdiction, other than
in the narrow circumstances laid out in the Second Restatement of
Judgments. 13 7
Furthermore, by viewing collateral bar in the context of collateral
attack on judgments in general, we see why the collateral bar rule
does not apply to a defendant in a civil contempt proceeding: when
such a defendant seeks to challenge the court order in question, the
defendant is making a direct challenge rather than a collateral one,
and therefore neither collateral bar nor any of the other rules sur-
rounding collateral attack apply.
With the scope of collateral bar now in better focus, the questions
become, to what extent is the rule justified, and how should the courts
temper it?
II
TEMPERING COLLATERAL BAR: SCOPE OF THE EXCEPTIONS
Courts usually justify collateral bar in vague terms that stress the
importance of protecting judicial authority and maintaining the rule
of law. For example, in concurring in the United Mine Workers deci-
sion, Justice Frankfurter wrote: "If one man can be allowed to deter-
mine for himself what is law, every man can. That means first chaos,
then tyranny."1 38 Similarly, the Walker Court reasoned that "in the fair
administration of justice no man can be judge in his own case, how-
ever exalted his station, however righteous his motives, and irrespec-
tive of his race, color, politics, or religion." 39 The Court went on to
explain that "respect for judicial process is a small price to pay for the
137 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1982).
138 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 312 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
139 Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1967).
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civilizing hand of law, which alone can give abiding meaning to consti-
tutional freedom."' 40
As compelling as these statements are, one ought to seek a more
precise and concrete justification for a rule that has such a significant
impact on society. Moreover, in looking more closely at the collateral
bar rule's justification, it may turn out that the rule is justified only to
a certain point, and that it should be tempered beyond that point.
Indeed, there are strong arguments for tempering the collateral bar
rule, and the Supreme Court has itself suggested that the rule must
have exceptions. Yet the Court's vague justification for the rule pro-
vides no guidance on how to tailor these exceptions.
A. The Justification for Collateral Bar
Many people argue that collateral bar is not justified at all, or that
it is unjustified any time a constitutional right is at stake.14' These
people argue that one should always be free to attack a court order
after violating it-in other words, that the Supreme Court should ei-
ther scrap the rule or define the exceptions to it so broadly as to effec-
tively scrap the rule by swallowing it.14 2 One argument in support of
140 Id. at 321; see also In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1344 (1st Cir. 1986)
(referring to the collateral bar rule as the "sine qua non of orderly government"); United
States v. CNN, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1549, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1994) ("The thin but bright line
between anarchy and order-the delicate balance which ultimately is the vital protection
of the individual and the public generally-is the respect which litigants and the public
have for the law and the orders issued by the courts.").
141 See, e.g., Norman G. Rudman & Richard C. Solomon, Who Loves a Parade? Walker v.
City of Birmingham, 4 LAw TRANSITION Q. 185, 185 (1967) (warning that with respect to
the rule's application in Walker, "[i]ndividual liberty seems to be the loser, and the casualty
list remains to be completed"); Shapiro, supra note 7, at 582 (arguing that the rule should
be "ceremoniously interred in the legal graveyard alongside the fellow-servant rule, one
federal common law, privity requirements in product liability cases, and separate but
equal" (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted)); Justice Confused, L.A TIMES, Mar.
20, 1986, Pt. 2, at 6 ("Doesn't it strike the judge as odd to be punishing someone for
disobeying an unlawful order that never should have been issued in the first place?"); Ir-
ving R. Kaufman, Awaiting an Answer on Courts as Censors, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1988, Pt. 2, at 7;
A Question of Contempt, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1986, at C6.
142 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 7, at 588-93. Many of the arguments on this issue are
closely related to the question of whether the contempt power itself is justified, and obvi-
ously those who answer this question in the negative view collateral bar as, a fortiori, unjus-
tified. Punishment for contempt can be swift and severe. See United States v. Dixon, 509
U.S. 688, 724 n.2 (1993) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
.some courts have found no bar to the imposition of a prison sentence for contempt even
where the court order that was transgressed was an injunction against violation of a statute
that itself did not provide for imprisonment as a penalty"); United States v. Berardelli, 565
F.2d 24, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1977) (affirming the imposition of a five-year sentence for appel-
lant's refusal to testify after being ordered to do so and granted immunity); United States
v. Sternman, 433 F.2d 913, 914 (6th Cir. 1970) (affirming the imposition of a three-year
sentence for the same); GOLDFARB, supra note 122, at 15 (discussing a seventeenth century
English case in which a defendant who threw a "brickbat" at the ChiefJustice had his "right
hand... cut off and fixed to the gibbet" and "was immediately hanged in the presence of
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this position is that courts do allow people to challenge statutes after
violating them.1 43 Why then are courts so hesitant to allow people to
do the same with court orders?144 Indeed, one should be skeptical
when the courts themselves argue that their commands are more im-
portant for maintaining the rule of law than the commands of the
legislature.
There are, however, a number of responses to this argument.
First, the commands of a court are different from the commands of
the legislature. A statute must be interpreted by a court before it actu-
ally applies to a particular party, whereas a court simultaneously
makes and interprets a court order. More importantly, whereas a stat-
ute is usually a general command that applies to the population at
large, a judge issues a court order only after an individual determina-
tion about particular parties. 145 To the extent that an order impinges
on one party's rights, it is (or should be) individually tailored to pro-
tect the other party's rights.1 46 In many cases, courts must balance
the court"). Indeed, as one judge described it, the court's power of contempt is "perhaps,
nearest akin to despotic power of any power existing under our form of government."
State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Circuit Court of Eau Claire County, 72 N.W. 193, 194-95 (Wis.
1897). Although it is deeply ingrained in common law thinking, the contempt power is
alien to many civil law countries, which tend to view it as both unnecessary and contrary to
basic notions of governance. See Prosecutor v. Milan Vujin, No. IT-94-1-A-R77, 17 and
n.20 (Int'l Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 2000) (noting that instead of using
the contempt power to discourage conduct that interferes with the administration ofjus-
tice, civil law systems rely on statutes that proscribe narrow and clearly-defined conduct);
GOLDFARB, supra note 122, at 2; Ruth Greenspan Bell & Susan E. Bromm, Lessons Learned in
the Transfer of US.-Generated Environmental Compliance Tools: Compliance Schedules for Poland,
27 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,296, 10,299 (1997) (noting the absence of the con-
tempt power in Polish courts); John 0. Haley, Competition and Trade Policy: Antitrust Enforce-
ment: Do Differences Matter?, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'YJ. 303, 311 (1995); Peter F. Schlosser,
Lectures on Civil-Law Litigation Systems and American Cooperation with Those Systems, 45 U. KAN.
L. REV. 9, 29 (1996) (discussing alternatives to the contempt power used in France,
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg); James D. Fry, Note, Struggling to Teethe: Ja-
pan's Antitrust Enforcement Regime, 32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 825, 854-56 (2001) (noting
the absence of the contempt power in Japanese courts).
Yet, this is not to say that the contempt power has no place in a democratic society. As
noted in one classic work on the subject, "Throughout our history contempt has been the
vehicle for deciding a variety of dramatic and significant social problems." GOLDFARB,
supra note 122, at 5. While many countries' legal systems utilize alternatives to the con-
tempt power, the United States's system relies on it and is adapted to it. For the same
reasons that collateral bar is justified, see infra Part IIA, so too is contempt power, a fortiori,
justified within our particular legal system.
143 Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 319 (1958); 1 LAURENCE M. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-9, 3-10 (3d ed. 2000).
144 See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 324, 334 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting); Shapiro, supra note 7, at 578-83.
145 See FED. R. Ctv. P. 65; Anthony Lewis, 'The Civilizing Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1986,
at A27.
146 SeeAm. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986)
(describing the standard for granting preliminary injunctions); Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp.
v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 1973) (same).
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constitutional rights against each other, as, for instance, when a crimi-
nal defendant seeks to order a newspaper not to publish certain infor-
mation that would prejudice jurors.147 Furthermore, court orders in
the form of injunctions are often stop-gap emergency measures that
courts use to preserve the status quo until they issue a final
decision.' 48
Second, courts permit people to disobey statutes and to chal-
lenge them subsequently not because they are unconcerned with the
rule of law when it comes to the legislature, but because the courts'
rules on justiciability generally prevent people from challenging stat-
utes without disobeying them. 149 In contrast, justiciability rules do not
prevent people from challenging court orders without disobeying
them. 150
Third, society can live with a rule that allows a person to chal-
lenge a statute she has disobeyed, even if it cannot afford to grant the
same right to a person who has disobeyed a court order. The legisla-
ture does not stand as a final barricade to anarchy and disorder in the
same way that courts do. Whereas the legislature lays down the rules,
it is the courts that must apply them daily to preserve order. Moreo-
ver, disobedience to statutes does not interfere with the functioning of
the legislature, whereas disobedience to court orders does in fact in-
terfere with the functioning of the courts.
A more basic argument against collateral bar is that it simply gives
courts too much power to stifle conduct. This is an important point,
especially if one considers some of the more blatant historical exam-
ples of courts abusing their contempt power. 15 1 Furthermore, collat-
147 See United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1990).
148 See FED. R. CIv. P. 65.
149 See TRIBE, supra note 143, §§ 3-9, 3-10.
150 See id. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure anticipate challenges to court
orders at the trial level prior to disobedience, see FED. R. Civ. P. 59, 60, 65 (b), and the U.S.
Code anticipates such challenges at the appellate level prior to disobedience, see 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1291, 1292 (2000).
151 On the abuse of the contempt power, the Supreme Court has remarked: "Contu-
macy often strikes at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's temperament,
and its fusion of legislative, executive, and judicial powers summons forth ... the prospect
of the most tyrannical licentiousness." Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512
U.S. 821, 831 (1994) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omit-
ted) (quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 822 (1987)
and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968)). For examples of such abuse, see Labun-
ski, First Amendment Exception, supra note 7, at 424-30. One of the more notable examples
Labunski discusses is Zarcone v. Perry, in which a Long Island judge had a street vendor
handcuffed, paraded through the courthouse, and interrogated for selling him unsatisfac-
tory coffee. 572 F.2d 52, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1978). Perhaps even more unnerving is Malina v.
Gonzales, in which a judge sentenced a driver to five hours in jail for honking and motion-
ing at him on the highway. 994 F.2d 1121, 1123 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Livingston, supra
note 122, at 356 ("The history of contempt procedures reveals an ongoing and overt ten-
sion between the view of contempt as an inherent and necessary weapon of courts to en-
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eral bar can be a particularly powerful weapon for stifling social
change. Simply by forcing people to delay their actions while appeal-
ing orders directly, courts can effectively kill strikes and demonstra-
tions.152 As Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote from his jail cell in
Birmingham: "For years now I have heard the word 'Wait!' It rings in
the ear of every Negro with piercing familiarity. This 'Wait' has al-
most always meant 'Never.' . . . Perhaps it is easy for those who have
never felt the stinging darts of segregation to say, 'Wait."' 153
The response, however, is that collateral bar can cut both ways.
Although it can function as an oppressive weapon, it can function
equally well as a tool for social change. 154 Indeed, court orders were
critical in the civil rights movement: it was often through the threat of
contempt sanctions that the federal courts coerced intransigent state
officials into implementing desegregation.1 55 King himself recog-
force their orders and the fear that courts will misuse their authority to punish unpopular
individuals or groups." (footnote omitted)); Ohio Judge Wasn't Afraid to Play Many Parts in
Court, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 22, 2002, at A12 (discussing an Ohio judge's fall from grace when he
conducted, among other things, a contempt hearing at which he acted as judge, prosecu-
tor, and witness).
152 See Fiss, supra note 4, at 1-4; FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION 200-01 (1930). As Professor Chafee notes, "One of the great evils of labor
injunctions ... was that an appeal from a wrongful or grossly broad, temporary injunction
often did the union no good when it won. The injunction broke the strike in a week. The
appeal might be decided favorably in a year or more . . . ." CHAEE, supra note 7, at 373.
The comments of Representative Celler of New York in discussing the Norris-LaGuardia
Act are also illuminating: "Time is the essence of the strike. Keeping the injunction alive
by dilatory tactics blunts the edge of the only effective instrument that labor possesses,
namely, the strike." 75 CONG. REc. 5489 (1932).
153 KING, supra note 29, at 83.
154 Cf GOLDFARB, supra note 122, at 9 (discussing the contempt power in general).
155 See Fiss, supra note 4, at 4-6. In one of the most famous cases, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held both the Governor and Lieutenant Governor of Mississippi in
civil contempt for violating a restraining order by obstructing a black student's admission
to the University of Mississippi. See Meredith v. Fair, 313 F.2d 532, 533 (5th Cir. 1962) (per
curiam) (holding Governor Ross R. Barnett in civil contempt and threatening a fine of
$10,000 per day until he purged himself); Meredith v. Fair, 313 F.2d 534, 535 (5th Cir.
1962) (per curiam) (holding Lieutenant Governor Paul B. Johnson, Jr. in civil contempt
and threatening a fine of $5,000 per day until he purged himself); see also United States v.
Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 700 (1964) (denying the Governor and Lieutenant Governor the
right to a jury trial in their criminal contempt proceedings for the same disobedience);
United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99, 101 (5th Cir. 1965) (finding that the Governor and
Lieutenant Governor had substantially complied with the previous court orders and, there-
fore, dismissing the criminal contempt proceedings and declining to impose the
threatened sanctions from the civil contempt proceedings). For other examples of the use
of contempt to implement desegregation, see Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92, 96-97 (6th
Cir. 1957) (affirming segregationist John Kasper's criminal contempt conviction for violat-
ing a court order restraining him from obstructing desegregation of Tennessee high
schools); Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683, 695 (6th Cir. 1959) (affirming criminal con-
tempt convictions, including a second conviction of Kasper, for obstructing Tennessee de-
segregation). For a brief discussion of the Justice Department's strategy of using court
orders to back up its civil rights enforcement activities in the South between 1960 and
1963, see WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 27, at 39-44. As an example of one such order,
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nized this reality and as a result often went out of his way to obey court
orders.1 56 In the words of former New York Times columnist Anthony
Lewis:
This country depends on law more than any other on earth. Courts
have to pass on the tensest issues of public policy: race relations, the
environment, Presidential power. If it became the practice to ig-
nore court orders in the belief that they will later be found invalid,
the system would not work. 15
7
Although absence of the rule might not lead to "chaos" and "tyr-
anny,"1 58 its absence would encourage greater disobedience and, thus,
unduly burden those parties who rely on court orders to protect their
rights. To understand this, imagine the choices available to a party, D,
faced with an appealable court order in the absence of the collateral
bar rule. If D believes that the order is in some way flawed, D can
choose between appealing directly or disobeying and then challeng-
ing the order collaterally if D is charged with contempt. Direct appeal
may be safer because the worst that can happen is that the order will
be upheld-D will not risk punishment for contempt. However, dis-
obeying the order might also have its advantages. First, disobedience
gives D's opponent, or the state, the burden of coming forward to
prosecute the contempt,1 59 a burden which may entail prohibitive fi-
nancial or political costs. Second, even if a party does come forward
to prosecute the contempt, if that party seeks to impose a significant
punishment, D will likely be entitled to a jury trial,160 and a jury may
be more sympathetic than a judge would be on direct appeal. Third,
if D is an organization that regularly confronts court orders, such as a
newspaper, D might simply fear that obedience during direct appeal
which formed an integral part of the Justice Department's strategy, see United States v.
United States Klans, Knights of Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897 (M.D. Ala. 1961).
Another important function of court orders is to protect individuals from physical
harm, particularly in the context of domestic violence. See David M. Zlotnick, Empowering
the Battered Woman: The Use of Criminal Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil Protection Orders, 56
OHIO ST. L.J. 1153 (1995) (arguing for a greater use of criminal contempt sanctions for
violations of protection orders in domestic violence cases).
156 See WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 27, at 45-46, 152-53.
157 Lewis, supra note 145 (arguing in favor of applying the collateral bar rule to a
Rhode Island newspaper that violated a restraining order). Lewis goes on to note that "[i]f
we think Southern segregationists had to obey court orders in the old days, if we think
Richard Nixon had to obey the Supreme Court decision that forced him out of the Presi-
dency, why should the press be different?" Id. The New York Times's editors were similarly
supportive of the collateral bar rule in the wake of the Walker decision. While noting that it
was "profoundly embarrassing to the good name of the United States" to send King to jail,
they argued that the rule was, nonetheless, "absolutely basic to a democratic society" and
that the Supreme Court was right not to make an exception in this case. See ... and Dr.
King to Jail, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1967, at 46.
158 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
159 See 3 WPJGHT ET AL., supra note 79, § 711, at 852.
160 See id. § 712, at 856.
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will establish a practice that could weaken its position in the future. 61
Finally, obedience during the time necessary to appeal may impose
direct costs that D may wish to avoid.
Because the court will have already determined that the order is
necessary to prevent some harm-in many cases, irreparable harm-
allowing D to make this choice seems to undermine the whole pur-
pose of the court order. This is certainly true if the system allows D to
base the choice on any of the first three factors discussed above. To a
large extent, it is also true if the system allows D to base the choice on
the fourth factor. Collateral bar is the device by which the system pre-
vents these outcomes. The rule's justification is that it keeps the deci-
sion as to whether the order is flawed in the hands of the court, where
it belongs, by forcing D to obey the order while pursuing direct
review.
But what if the order is not appealable and compliance will irrep-
arably harm D? Or, what if it is appealable, but compliance during
the time necessary for appeal will irreparably harm D? In such cases,
mechanically applying the collateral bar rule would place a huge bur-
den on D, and it is not clear that applying the rule would be necessary
to protect the system.
One solution might be to rely on the fact that a judge always has
discretion to lessen or waive punishment even if D is convicted of con-
tempt.162 Certainly, it would seem appropriate for a judge to do so if
the order were flawed. 163 However, this solution relies on the discre-
161 See A Question of Contempt, supra note 141 (noting that fear of establishing a practice
of delay, and not the need for speedy publication, was what motivated a Rhode Island
newspaper to violate a 1985 restraining order).
162 See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2000).
163 For example, in Donovan v. City of Dallas, the Supreme Court suggested that the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals might decline to punish a number of parties who had dis-
obeyed an invalid court order, regardless of Texas's collateral bar rule. See 377 U.S. 408,
414 (1964). After the Texas court had convicted the parties for contempt, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review both a direct appeal of the order as well as an appeal of
the contempt conviction. See id. at 411. After holding that the order was in fact invalid, the
Supreme Court also vacated the contempt conviction on the ground that the Texas court
might not have chosen to punish the parties had it known that its order was invalid. Id. at
414. On remand, the Texas court indeed did not wish to punish the parties. See City of
Dallas v. Brown, 384 S.W.2d 724, 725-26 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (dismissing a motion to
reinstate the contempt conviction and refunding the fines and costs the court already
imposed).
One might ask, then, why the Supreme Court did not vacate and remand the Walker
conviction, as it did in Donovan, to allow the lower court to reconsider, in its discretion,
whether to impose punishment. One reason is that in Donovan, the Court ruled on the
order's validity because it faced a direct appeal of the order in addition to the appeal of the
contempt conviction. Donovan, 377 U.S. at 411. In Walker, on the other hand, the Court
reviewed only the contempt conviction, see infra text accompanying note 178, so it did not
change any of the factors that the lower court had considered when it initially exercised its
discretion to impose punishment. Had the Supreme Court remanded Walker, there would
have been nothing for the lower court to reconsider.
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tion of the very judge who issued the problematic order. That fact,
combined with the risk of judicial abuse of the contempt power, 164
suggests that something more is needed to adequately protect D's
rights.
B. What Should Be the Rule's Exceptions?
The Supreme Court has suggested a number of exceptions to the
collateral bar rule. As discussed above, in United Mine Workers, the
Court suggested that a disobedient party might be able to attack sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction if the assertion of such jurisdiction were "frivo-
lous and not substantial." 165 In Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric
Railway & Motor Coach Employees, Division 988 v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board and In re Green, the Court held that a party can attack
subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that jurisdiction was lacking
due to federal preemption. 166 However, these are the usual, ex-
tremely narrow grounds for collateral attack on subject-matter juris-
diction, and they do not address the potential burden on D that the
courts should try to eliminate. Subject-matter jurisdiction simply re-
lates to the allocation of power between courts; 167 it has little to do
with the burden a court order may place on a party. While the first
exception may encompass some considerations of fairness to the par-
ties involved, the second exception is concerned solely with the effect
that the court's exercise of jurisdiction will have on other courts.
In Walker, the Supreme Court suggested two additional excep-
tions168 to the collateral bar rule. First, the Court stressed that this
was "not a case where the injunction was transparently invalid or had
only a frivolous pretense to validity,"' 69 thus suggesting an exception
to the rule in such situations. However, the opinion itself provides no
clear guidance as to the contours of this exception, because many
164 See supra note 151.
165 See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
166 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
167 See Dobbs, Consent, supra note 63, at 54 (observing that "the jurisdictional concept
[historically] was a fundamental constitutional tool for allocating power"). Indeed, the
idea of collaterally attacking jurisdiction originated in medieval England, where royal
courts struggled for power against local and ecclesiastical courts. Because direct appellate
review by the royal courts was difficult in the case of local courts, or impossible in the case
of ecclesiastical courts, the royal courts used lack ofjurisdiction to collaterally attack these
courts' judgments and thereby stop these courts from usurping royal power. See id. at
56-57, 60. For an interesting discussion of the mechanics of this procedure, see Krugman,
supra note 49, at 165 & n.7, 166.
168 As with the exception suggested in United Mine Workers, this Note refers to the
Walker Court's suggestions as exceptions because the defendant would apparently have the
burden of proving them. See supra note 112.
169 Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967).
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would argue that the Alabama injunction was transparently invalid,
and yet the Court did not apply the exception to King's case.17
The ambiguity of this exception has led the lower federal courts
to interpret it narrowly, if they acknowledge it at all. For instance, the
First and Second Circuits have both held that a party can rely on the
transparently-invalid-order exception only if the party has made a
"good faith effort to seek emergency relief from the appellate
court" 17 1 prior to violating the order, or can show compelling circum-
stances, such as a need to act immediately, excusing the decision not
to seek some kind of emergency relief.' 72 Yet the Supreme Court's
plain language does not support this requirement. What the Supreme
Court's precedent may warrant is simply a narrow reading of what
constitutes a transparently invalid order. 173
To the extent that this exception will ever come into play, it still
does not address the potential burden on D that courts should try to
eliminate. When the First Circuit first discussed this exception, it rea-
soned that a court has "no right to expect compliance" with a "trans-
parently invalid" order. 174 This seems like a particularly odd reason to
make an exception, especially if the exception's purpose is to protect
the rights of the parties: the purpose of tempering collateral bar is not
to punish courts, but to protect people from having to choose be-
tween irreparable harm and punishment for contempt. The degree
to which an order is erroneous does not necessarily affect the burden
that the order places on the affected party. In fact, the more errone-
ous or "transparently invalid" an order is, the easier it should be for D
to correct it on direct appeal. 175
One might argue that if the order is "transparently invalid," D
should not even have to go through the motions of a direct appeal.' 7 6
For instance, why should the courts require Martin Luther King, Jr. to
appeal his anti-demonstration injunction in the prejudiced Alabama
170 See Shapiro, supra note 7, at 572-76; cf Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court 1966
Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 143-44 (1966) ("[I]f 'transparency' is an independent precondi-
tion for collateral attacks upon injunctions, it seems that such attacks will rarely be allowed,
for the Walker decree, which was held not to be 'transparent,' was extremely broad.").
171 United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Terry, 17 F.3d 575, 579 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Providence Journal)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1354, 1355 (1st Cir. 1987) (en
banc).
172 Cutler, 58 F.3d at 832; Providence Journa4 820 F.2d at 1355.
173 See Black, supra note 170, at 144 ("Possibly, an injunction would be considered
transparent' only if it had no rational relation to the promotion of any legitimate state
interests, as in the case of the suppression of 'pure speech.').
174 In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1347 (1st Cir. 1986), modified, 820 F.2d
1354 (en banc).
175 See CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 361.
176 See, e.g., Note, Liability of the Lawyer for Advising Disobedience, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 433,
435 (1939).
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court system? Although King's case is certainly a compelling and ex-
treme example, the response is, why not? If D is not unduly burdened
by obeying the order while it is on direct appeal, why not force D to
do so, thereby keeping the decision in the hands of the courts?177
The real question should be whether D is unduly burdened, a ques-
tion that the "transparently invalid" standard simply does not reach.
The second exception that the Supreme Court suggested in
Walker comes much closer to addressing the burden issue: the Court
stated that "[t]his case would arise in quite a different constitutional
posture if the petitioners, before disobeying the injunction, had chal-
lenged it in the Alabama courts, and had been met with delay or frus-
tration of their constitutional claims."' 78 This exception appears to
have formed the basis for the Court's subsequent holding in Maness v.
Meyers, 179 a case that clearly illustrates the type of burden on D that
the courts should seek to eliminate.
1. Maness v. Meyers
Maness arose out of a Texas court subpoena commanding a local
magazine-seller, Michael McKelva, to produce fifty-two' 80 porno-
graphic magazines and to testify in a civil proceeding under a local
obscenity statute. 181 McKelva's lawyers, Karl A. Maley and Michael A.
Maness, counseled McKelva to disobey the order and moved to quash
the subpoena on the ground that obedience would entail a substantial
possibility of self-incrimination. 182 The Texas judge denied the mo-
tion, but McKelva still refused to testify or produce the magazines,
stating that he was doing so on the advice of counsel to protect his
Fifth Amendment rights. 183 The judge held McKelva, Maley, and Ma-
ness in criminal contempt and sentenced them each to ten days in jail
177 See CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 361.
178 Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 318 (1958).
179 419 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1975).
180 The parties subsequently stipulated that McKelva was not in possession of five of
the magazines; therefore, they reduced the list to forty-seven. See Petition for Certiorari
app. at 5, 7-8, Maness (No. 73-689).
181 See Maness, 419 U.S. at 450-51; Petition for Certiorari app. at 2-4, Maness (No. 73-
689) (reprinting the subpoena).
182 See Maness, 419 U.S. at 451-52; Petition for Certiorari app. at 4-11, 13-15, Maness
(No. 73-689) (reprinting Defendant's Motion to Quash Subpoena and transcript of oral
arguments presented at hearing).
183 See Maness, 419 U.S. at 453.
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and a $200 fine.18 4 Only Maness's conviction ultimately reached the
Supreme Court. 8 5
Maness's arguments before the Court focused on both McKelva's
predicament of facing an order that would have required him to give
up his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination, and also on
his own predicament of owing allegiance to both the court and his
client. 8 6 Maness argued that the application of the collateral bar rule
is appropriate only if there are effective avenues for judicial review to
challenge suspect orders, and that the rule does not apply if this re-
view is unavailable and the only choice, therefore, is between disobedi-
184 See id. at 455; Petition for Certiorari app. at 29, Maness (No. 73-689) (reprinting the
hearing transcript). Thejudge held McKelva in contempt for "willfully and knowingly...
failing and refusing to obey" the subpoena duces tecum, and he held the lawyers in con-
tempt for "advising and counseling" this disobedience. City of Temple v. McKelva, No.
57,284-C (Dist. Ct. of Bell Co., Tex., 169thJud. Dist. Feb. 2, 1973), reprinted in Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 30, Maness (No. 73-689). With regard to the lawyers, the judge noted
his reluctance to hold attorneys in contempt, stating that this was the first time the court
had done so; he found, however, that the defendants had "usurped" the court's authority
by denying it the ability to rule on the admissibility of the evidence. See Petition for Certio-
rari app. at 31, Maness (No. 73-689). The judge believed that the proper way to protect
McKelva's Fifth Amendment rights would have been to move to suppress the evidence, or
to make an objection to its introduction in any subsequent criminal trial. See Maness, 419
U.S. at 455; Petition for Certiorari app. at 32, Maness (No. 73-689).
As a deputy sheriff led McKelva out of the courtroom and summarily jailed him, an
apparently shaken Maness ttempted, unsuccessfully, to salvage the situation by apologiz-
ing to the court, and by stressing that his and his co-counsel's behavior resulted merely
from a "philosophical difference" with the court regarding the applicable law. See Maness,
419 U.S. at 455; Petition for Certiorari app. at 17, 32, Maness (No. 73-689) (reprinting the
hearing transcript).
185 McKelva spent seven days in jail and filed a habeas corpus petition in federal dis-
trict court before the judge ordered him released for "good behavior" and remitted the
entire $200 fine, thus mooting his habeas petition. See Brief for the Petitioner at 12, 71, 73,
Maness (No. 73-689). It appears that he then pursued a direct appeal of the contempt
judgment in Texas court and ultimately reached a settlement with the City Prosecutor. See
McKelva v. City of Temple, 506 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (remanding McKelva's
appeal "to the district court on showing of the parties that all matters in controversy [had]
been settled").
The court permitted Maness and Maley, as attorneys, to post personal recognizance
bonds and granted them a separate contempt hearing before a differentjudge, as required
under Texas law. See Maness, 419 U.S. at 456-57; Petition for Certiorari at 17, Maness (No.
73-689). The new judge, James R. Meyers, agreed with the contempt finding, but he
changed the penalty to a $500 fine with no confinement. See Maness, 419 U.S. at 457. After
exhausting all of his state remedies, Maness then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari, which it granted. See id. at 457-58.
At the same time, Maley pursued a separate avenue for relief, filing a habeas corpus
petition in a federal district court. See id. That court granted Maley's petition. See Maley v.
Meyers, No. W-73-CA-87 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 1973), reprinted in Brief for the Petitioner at
74, Maness (No. 73-689). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit waited for
the Supreme Court's Maness decision before affirming the district court, in accordance
with Maness. See Maness, 419 U.S. at 458; Maley v. Meyers, 512 F.2d 1404 (5th Cir. 1975)
(unpublished table decision).
186 See Brief for the Petitioner at 26-58, Maness (No. 73-689).
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ence and the irreparable loss of a fundamental right.' 87 The Texas
Criminal Defense Lawyers Association filed an amicus brief, stressing
the importance of the case not only for Maness, but for all attorneys in
the United States.1 8 The brief argued that Maness faced much more
than just the $500 fine: opposing parties could use his contempt con-
viction for impeachment and sentencing purposes in any future crimi-
nal proceeding, and, moreover, the conviction could lead to
disciplinary action by the bar association, foreclose opportunities for
appointment to the bench, and damage his reputation in the legal
community.18 9
In response, the Texas judge who had convicted Maness ar-
gued190 that the subpoena did not threaten McKelva's Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination because the subpoena was issued
in a civil trial and the evidence could always be suppressed in any sub-
sequent criminal trial.' 9 l He argued further that, even if the sub-
poena did threaten McKelva's rights, the collateral bar rule required
obedience.' 92
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Texas judge and unani-
mously reversed Maness's contempt conviction. 193 In doing so, the
Court stressed that an order by a court to reveal information at trial
presents a different situation than do other types of orders to which
the collateral bar rule applies.' 94  In the former situation,
" [c] ompliance could cause irreparable injury because appellate courts
cannot always 'unring the bell' once the information has been re-
leased. Subsequent appellate vindication does not necessarily have its
ordinary consequence of totally repairing the error. ' 195 Therefore, a
party to whom such an order is directed may disobey the order and
187 See id. at 42-43.
188 See Brief for the Amicus Curiae Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association at 11,
Maness (No. 73-689).
189 See id. (quoting In re Butts, 493 F.2d 842, 844 (5th Cir. 1974)).
190 Note that Meyers's actual arguments, written by the Texas Attorney General, were
relatively short, totaling fewer than thirteen pages. See Brief for the Respondent at 4-11,
Maness (No. 73-689); Supplemental Brief of Respondent, Maness (No. 73-689). Maness's
arguments, in contrast, totaled over thirty-nine pages. See Brief for the Petitioner at 26-58,
Maness (No. 73-689); Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 2-8, Maness (No. 73-689). Although
the Texas Attorney General presumably had a number of interests at stake in defeating
Maness's petition, it is relevant to note that in 1973 the Texas legislature entirely repealed
the obscenity statute under which the judge had subpoenaed McKelva, and under which
local authorities could have prosecuted him. See Maness, 419 U.S. at 451 n.1 (noting the
statute's repeal). Thus, the case may have been a low priority for the Texas Attorney Gen-
eral by the time he filed his brief in July 1974.
191 See Brief for the Respondent at 8-9, Maness (No. 73-689).
192 See id. at 7-9.
193 Maness, 419 U.S. at 470.
194 Id. at 460.
195 Id.
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collaterally attack its validity during contempt proceedings. 196 The
Court found "[t]his method of achieving precompliance review ...
particularly appropriate where the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination is involved. 1 9 7 Although the Court noted that the
case would be different if a judge had granted McKelva immunity
from prosecution, it rejected Judge Meyers's argument that the possi-
bility to suppress or object to the admission of the magazines in any
future prosecution was sufficient protection to safeguard McKelva's
right against self-incrimination. 198 "Here the 'cat' was not yet 'out of
the bag' and reliance upon a later objection or motion to suppress
would 'let the cat out' with no assurance whatever of putting it
back." 99
However, the Court went on to stress as an additional ground for
reversal the fact that the case involved a lawyer advising his client.
The Court noted the "crucial distinction between citing a recalcitrant
witness for contempt, and citing the witness's lawyer for contempt
based only on advice given in good faith to assert the privilege against
self-incrimination. '" 20 0 Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, which
Justice Blackmun joined, also stressed this aspect of the case.2 0 ' As a
result, the breadth of the Court's holding is undefined, and one can-
not say with absolute certainty that the Court would have reversed
McKelva's conviction had that issue been before it.
Even assuming that the Court would have reversed McKelva's
conviction, it is still not immediately clear what Maness stands for. On
one hand, the Court stressed that complying with the order would
have caused "irreparable injury."20 2 On the other hand, one could
196 The Court stated:
[W]e have consistently held that the necessity for expedition in the admin-
istration of the criminal law justifies putting one who seeks to resist the
production of desired information to a choice between compliance with a
trial court's order to produce prior to any review of that order, and resis-
tance to that order with the concomitant possibility of an adjudication of
contempt if his claims are rejected on appeal.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting the dictum of United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530,
532-33 (1971)).
197 Id. at 461 (footnote omitted).
198 See id. at 461, 462 & n.9 ("Counsel for respondent could cite no Texas statute or
case giving assurance that the magazines would be suppressed because they were produced
involuntarily. ... )  In contrast, Justice White argued in his concurring opinion that
constitutionally imposed immunity from subsequent prosecution would protect a witness,
such as McKelva, who releases information upon threat of contempt. See id. at 474-75
(White, J., concurring). Still, Justice White agreed with the Court's reversal because the
state had failed to make it sufficiently clear to McKelva and his lawyers that this immunity
offered them protection. See id. (White, J., concurring).
199 Id. at 463.
200 Id. at 467 (citation omitted).
201 Id. at 470-72.
202 Id. at 460.
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argue that complying with the orders in United Mine Workers and
Walker also would have caused irreparable injury in that delay would
have effectively killed Lewis's strike and King's demonstration. 20 3 Yet,
the Maness Court cited United Mine Workers with approval20 4 and did
not indicate that it intended to overrule either that case or Walker.
The Maness exception must, therefore, cover harm more narrow than
that included in the ordinary meaning of "irreparable injury."
The Ninth Circuit, the Western District of New York, and the Dis-
trict of New Mexico have all limited Maness's "irreparable injury" to
infringements on the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion.205 For instance, in Hem Iron Works, the Ninth Circuit refused to
extend the Maness exception to a case in which a party disobeyed an
administrative search warrant that allegedly would have violated his
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches.20 6 The
party argued that there would have been no way to suppress the evi-
dence uncovered in the search, and that the only way to seek review of
the order was to disobey it and to challenge it collaterally.20 7 The
Ninth Circuit did not dispute those points, but nonetheless refused to
extend Maness to the Fourth Amendment context, essentially because
it found that doing so would place too great a burden on the public's
interest in conducting administrative searches. 208 The District of New
Mexico has gone even further, limiting the Maness exception to both
the context of self-incrimination and the context of lawyers advising
clients. 20 9
These interpretations of Maness are far too cramped, both in
terms of what the Supreme Court actually meant and in terms of how
the exception would be ideally tailored. There is no reason to think
that the Maness Court was more concerned with the right against self-
incrimination than with any other significant right. Rather, what the
Court seemed focused on was the defendant's inability to obtain di-
rect review before his right was destroyed.2 10 The key factor was that
subpoenas duces tecum are not appealable, so it was impossible for
203 See supra notes 42, 152 and accompanying text.
204 See Maness, 419 U.S. at 459.
205 See Dep't of Labor OSHA v. Hem Iron Works, Inc. (In re Establishment Inspection
of Hem Iron Works, Inc.), 881 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Walker, No.
94-CR-32S, 1994 WL 759866, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1994); Nat'l Excess Ins. Co. v. Civer-
olo, Hansen & Wolf, P.A., 139 F.R.D. 401, 404 (D.N.M. 1991).
206 See Hem Iron Works, 881 F.2d at 728-29.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 728 ("In the administrative search warrant cases, unlike in Maness, the adverse
consequences of delaying enforcement are predominant.").
209 See National Excess, 139 F.R.D. at 404; see also Kathleen A. Manning, Note, The Attor-
ney and Contempt: How Can He Advise His Client?, 36 LA. L. REv. 1057, 1065-66 (1976) (ob-
serving the harm that disclosure of privileged, but not constitutionally protected,
information can cause).
210 See supra text accompanying note 195.
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the defendant to obtain direct review.211 This interpretation accords
with the Supreme Court's suggestion in Walker that it would have al-
lowed collateral attack "if the petitioners, before disobeying the in-
junction, had challenged it [directly], and had been met with delay or
frustration. " 212 Furthermore, this interpretation would provide the
exception needed to adequately protect people faced with court or-
ders from undue burden.
2. Interpreting and Applying the Walker/Maness Exception
Courts should read Walker and Maness together as holding, as a
matter of due process,213 that if a party has no opportunity to obtain
full appellate review of a court order without permanently sacrificing
a significant right, then that party may disobey the order and chal-
lenge it as a defense to criminal contempt.214 This exception ensures
that a party always has the opportunity to appeal a court order at some
point. In fact, a party always has exactly one opportunity: if it is possi-
ble to appeal directly, then the party must do so; if it is impossible or
unduly burdensome to appeal directly, the party gets its one opportu-
nity instead on collateral attack.
This exception is easy to apply in cases like Maness, in which it is
procedurally impossible to appeal the order without disobeying it.
The exception becomes more difficult to apply in cases like Walker, in
which it is possible to appeal directly, but not without effectively de-
stroying the right in question. In these cases, the court must make an
objective determination as to exactly how much delay would have de-
stroyed a significant right.
In Walker, the Court had an easy way around this, because King
made no effort to appeal the order during the short time he had
before his scheduled demonstration.2 15 King had an opportunity to
appeal without suffering any harm, but he did not make use of it.
While one might question how much of an opportunity this was-
given that the time for appeal was less than two days and would have
entailed arguing before the segregationist Alabama courts-it was,
211 See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 460 (1975).
212 Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 318 (1967). That this dictum is re-
lated to the Maness exception has been lost on a number of the lower courts. For example,
in Novak, the Eleventh Circuit discussed one exception as being the absence of an effective
opportunity for review, and then cited Maness to support an entirely separate exception-
where the order would require an "irretrievable surrender of constitutional guarantees."
In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1401 (11th Cir. 1991); accord Hem Iron Works, 881 F.2d at
726-28; United States v. Walker, No. 94-CR-32S, 1994 WL 759866, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 21,
1994).
213 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
214 [ am indebted to Professor Kevin M. Clermont for suggesting this interpretation of
Walker and Maness.
215 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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nonetheless, an opportunity. Allowing someone to challenge an or-
der collaterally after passing up an opportunity to do so directly puts
that person in the position of our generic party D in the first example
above: it allows that person to make the decision to disobey based on a
number of factors that would unduly burden those whose rights de-
pend on court orders.
More difficult questions will arise if a future Martin Luther King
makes a good faith effort to appeal the order directly, but finally
reaches a critical juncture at which he believes further delay would
effectively kill the demonstration. Although courts may be tempted to
apply the collateral bar rule mechanically in such a case to avoid a
difficult decision, they should instead go through the fact-intensive
inquiry needed to determine for themselves whether further delay
would have effectively destroyed a significant right. Although this may
seem like a difficult and imprecise determination for the courts to
make, courts are regularly called upon to make such determinations.
In fact, courts must often engage in similar inquiries when deciding
whether to issue a court order to begin with.2
1 6
One drawback to this approach is that it will clearly leave a future
King in some uncertainty as to exactly when he may disobey. The
legitimacy of his actions necessarily will depend on whether a court
subsequently agrees with his assessment of the complicated situation.
However, many defenses to criminal charges pose similar problems
and are thus equally difficult for a defendant to rely on at the time he
acts. Self-defense and necessity are prime examples.21 7 Furthermore,
the more courts apply the Walker/Maness exception to particular
cases, the more this uncertainty can be lessened.
In fashioning and applying this exception over time, courts
should seek to delineate its boundaries in a clear and context-specific
manner.218 In the context of demonstrations and labor strikes, the
exception should hinge on the amount of delay that would have de-
stroyed the momentum needed to keep people in the streets or on the
picket lines. The question should not be whether compliance would
have prevented a future King from ever demonstrating again (in
which case he will never pass the test), or whether compliance would
216 See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
217 SeeWAvNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScOr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 441-50, 454-63 (2d ed.
1986).
218 Although each case will involve a fact-intensive inquiry, courts should subject the
ultimate question-whether the defendant had an opportunity to appeal the order without
having first to sacrifice permanently a significant right through compliance-to indepen-
dent appellate review in order to lay out clear constitutional boundaries. Cf., Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504-05 (1984) (holding that appellate courts must
independently review trial court findings of "actual malice" in defamation cases, so as to
retain control over the scope of the First Amendment's protections).
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have prevented him from demonstrating according to schedule (in
which case he will almost always pass the test), but whether compli-
ance would have prevented him from carrying out a particular cam-
paign-in the real King's case, for example, the 1963 campaign to
end segregation in Birmingham's commercial sector. In the context
of news publication, on the other hand, the exception should hinge
on the amount of delay that would have prevented the public from
receiving timely information. The question should not be whether a
story would have been less sensational and thus less profitable, but
whether the public would have been prevented from learning impor-
tant information in time to act on it-for example, whether a newspa-
per would have had to delay publishing crucial information about an
election until after that election.21 9
CONCLUSION
When Professor Zechariah Chafee examined the collateral bar
rule in 1950, he brought clarity to a confusing area of the law by focus-
ing on the fundamental distinction between the merits of a court or-
der and the court's authority to issue the order.220 Thus, he
approached the rule in the same way as one would approach collateral
attack on judgments in general, rather than approaching it as an iso-
lated doctrine. However, Chafee never accepted the doctrine ofjuris-
diction to determine jurisdiction. 221 He envisioned a "legal wall"
separating orders that are flawed on their merits from those that the
court never had authority to issue.222 On one side of the wall, orders
must be obeyed until set aside on direct appeal; on the other side,
orders may be freely disobeyed and challenged collaterally. 223 Thus,
Chafee's vision of collateral bar, while illuminating, failed to take into
account the steady creep of res judicata that was already well under
way.
Now fifty-two years later, Chafee's legal wall has been reduced to
a small speed bump, with res judicata preventing most collateral at-
tacks on prior judgments, regardless of the rendering court's power to
decide. Nonetheless, Chafee's approach to collateral bar remains val-
uable. Viewing the rule in the context of collateral attack on judg-
219 See Lewis, supra note 145.
220 See CHAFEE, supra note 7, at 296-380.
221 See id. at 319 n.42 (describing jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction as an "absurd
doctrine" akin to an "imaginary mongoose").
222 See id. at 300.
223 Id. Chafee complained that the confusion surrounding collateral bar had made
this wall "'as winding as the famous serpentine wall designed by Mr. Jefferson' at the Uni-
versity of Virginia," and he sought to straighten it. Id. (quoting Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, Champaign County, 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948) (Jackson,J.,
concurring)).
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ments in general makes it clear that collateral bar operates much like
the normal rules of res judicata, precluding attacks on both merits
and authority, subject to a few narrow exceptions. Once the scope of
the rule is in better focus, it should be easier for litigants to conform
to it, and for courts to see exactly how the rule should be tempered.
Collateral bar is an important rule, but it is justified only to the
extent that it strikes an appropriate balance between the rights of par-
ties who depend on court orders and the rights of those confronted
with them. In Walker and Maness, the Supreme Court fashioned an
exception to the rule that might achieve this balance. However, it did
so in an ambiguous manner, and the lower courts have insisted on
interpreting the exception as narrowly as possible. To remedy this
situation, the Supreme Court should clearly enunciate the Walker/Ma-
ness exception as allowing a party to collaterally attack a court order as
a defense to criminal contempt if the party was unable to appeal that
order directly without permanently sacrificing a significant right. Un-
til the Court is presented with an opportunity to do so, however, the
lower courts should simply interpret Walker and Maness accordingly.
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